In an action for alienation of affection, criminal conversation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the trial court properly entered
partial summary judgment for defendant based on the finding that the
statutory exclusion of certain noneconomic compensatory damages under
the Alienation of Affections Act and the Criminal Conversation Act is
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, No. 10-L-49; the Hon. Brendan A. Maher, Judge, presiding.
Robert C. Pottinger and Jody L. Booher, both of Barrick, Switzer, Long, Balsley & Van Evera, LLP, of Rockford, for appellant.
Andrew T. Smith and Charles P. Alexander, both of Cicero, France, Barch & Alexander, P.C., of Rockford, for appellee.
Justices Hudson and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Dean Murphy, filed a complaint against defendant, Dan Colson, and the trial court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, finding constitutional the statutory exclusion of certain noneconomic compensatory damages under the Alienation of Affections Act (740 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2008)) and the Criminal Conversation Act (740 ILCS 5/50 et seq. (West 2008)). Upon the court's Rule 304(a) finding (Ill. S.Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Sept. 20, 2006)), plaintiff appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 In 1991, plaintiff, a dentist, married Dawn Murphy. They had six children together, and they raised their family in the Catholic faith. According to the complaint, in August 2008, Dawn hired defendant as her personal trainer at the Cross Fit gym. Defendant knew that Dawn was married to plaintiff. Nevertheless, in December 2008, defendant began a course of conduct that included purchasing gifts for Dawn, taking Dawn on dates, and engaging in sexual relations with Dawn.
¶ 4 In November 2009, Dawn petitioned for a divorce from plaintiff. In September 2010, the court granted dissolution on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
¶ 5 In November 2010, plaintiff filed a three-count civil complaint against defendant for: (1) alienation of affection; (2) criminal conversation; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (intentional infliction of emotional distress is not at issue in this appeal).
¶ 6 In December 2011, plaintiff amended his complaint. As to damages, plaintiff broadly alleged that he cannot marry again, because to do so would be in direct contradiction to his Catholic faith. Specifically, plaintiff sought damages for: (a) marital counseling expenses; (b) loss of value of his dental practice (presumably through the distribution of property in the divorce case); (c) loss of value of a second dental business (again, presumably through the distribution of property in the divorce case); (d) maintenance payments to Dawn as ordered in the divorce case; (e) loss of an individual retirement account in his name (again, presumably through the distribution of property in the divorce case); (f) loss of Dawn's business referrals to his dental practice; (g) loss of income due to time spent away from work to address the family problems; (h) residential rental expenses during the divorce proceedings; (i) guardian ad litem and mediator expenses; (j) loss of consortium; (k) loss of society; (l) mental anguish; (m) injured feelings; (n) shame, humiliation, sorrow, and mortification; (o) defamation and injury to his good name and character; and (p) dishonor to his family.
¶ 7 As is at issue in this appeal, plaintiff also amended his complaint to seek a declaration that the statutory exclusion of certain noneconomic compensatory damages, under the Alienation of Affections Act and the Criminal Conversation Act, is unconstitutional. The nature of the exclusion and the constitutionality arguments will be set forth in detail in our analysis section.
¶ 8 In May 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality as to the statutory exclusion. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion. In ruling, the court noted that plaintiff had set forth many constitutional arguments but had developed only those concerning the separation of powers clause and the special legislation clause (and, as a component of that argument, the equal protection clause).
¶ 9 In November 2012, defendant filed his own motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that the statutory exclusion was indeed constitutional. The trial court granted defendant's motion and entered a Rule 304(a) finding. This appeal followed.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 A. Overview of ...