SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, District Judge.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and incarcerated in Menard Correctional Center, pursues claims arising from alleged excessive force during Plaintiff's incarceration in Western Illinois Correctional Center in June 2013. The case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
The Court is required by § 1915A to review a Complaint filed by a prisoner against a governmental entity or officer and, through such process, to identify cognizable claims, dismissing any claim that is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." To state a claim, the allegations must set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations must give enough detail to give "fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" EEOC v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc. , 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)( quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 (2007)(add'l citation omitted)).
On or about June 30, 2013, Plaintiff was in the chow line at Western Illinois Correctional Center, talking about a movie with other inmates. Plaintiff remarked, "I would like to have sex with her." Correctional Officer Harrison overheard the remark and allegedly thought Plaintiff was talking about Officer Harrison, but Plaintiff was actually talking about an actress in the movie, not Officer Harrison.
Later that day, Officer Harrison, Officer Wade, and an unknown Sergeant came to Plaintiff's cell and took Plaintiff to segregation, allegedly telling Plaintiff, "This is what we do to niggers." (Compl. p. 8.) Officers Smith and Grame joined the scene and allegedly proceeded to slam Plaintiff's face in the wall, knee him in the ribs, and bend Plaintiff's hands back so hard that Plaintiff lost sensation in his hands for 20 minutes, all the while hurling racial epithets at Plaintiff.
"The Eighth Amendment bars prison officials from using excessive force against inmates. Excessive force in this context means the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, ' which is force applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm' rather than force applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.'" Sanchez v. City of Chicago , 700 F.3d 919, 927 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoted and other cite omitted). Relevant factors in this determination include the need for the force and the amount of force used in relation to that need. Rice el rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services , 675 F.3d 650, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2012).
The allegations allow a plausible inference that Defendants Harrison, Wade, Smith, Grame, and the unknown sergeant either used excessive force on Plaintiff, caused excessive force to be used on Plaintiff, or failed to intervene to prevent excessive force being used on Plaintiff.
Also, a plausible inference arises that Defendants' actions were motivated by racial animus, which states an arguable equal protection claim. Racially derogatory remarks alone do not violate the Constitution, but treating a prisoner adversely because of his race does. See Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)("[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race....").
However, Plaintiff states no plausible claim for relief against Warden Williams. Warden Williams cannot be held liable for the constitutional violations of his employees solely because Williams is in charge. Plaintiff's allegations allow no inference that Williams was involved in the excessive force in any way. Kuhn v. Goodlow , 678 F.3d 552. 556 (7th Cir. 2012)("An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.'")(quoted cite omitted); Matthews v. City of East St. Louis , 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012)("To show personal involvement, the supervisor must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.'")(quoted cite omitted); Chavez v. Illinois State Police , 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)(no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Warden Williams will therefore be dismissed.
Plaintiff is advised that the Court cannot serve the "unknown sergeant" until Plaintiff identifies the name of the sergeant. If Plaintiff is unable to discover the name on his own and the name is not provided by Defense counsel, Plaintiff should send Defendants' counsel a discovery request seeking the name. Failure to timely identify the unknown sergeant after Defendants have been served will result in dismissal of the unknown sergeant.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Plaintiff states the following constitutional claims: 1) Defendants Harrison, Wade, Smith, Grame, and an unknown sergeant either used excessive force on Plaintiff, caused excessive force to be used on Plaintiff, or failed to intervene to prevent excessive force being used on Plaintiff in violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights; and 2) the actions of Defendants Harrison, Wade, Smith, Grame, and an unknown sergeant were taken because of Plaintiff's race in violation of Plaintiff's equal protection rights. This case proceeds solely on the claims identified in this paragraph. Any ...