UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. DORALE ELLIS, Petitioner,
NEDREA CHANDLER, Respondent.
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on Petitioner Dorale Ellis' (Ellis) pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus (Petition) brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons stated below, the Petition is denied.
In July 2003, Ellis was convicted in a jury trial of attempted first-degree murder for putting a gun to the victim's neck and shooting him. Ellis was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction on March 31, 2005, and Ellis filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court (PLA), which was denied on September 29, 2005.
On March 10, 2006, Ellis filed a post-conviction petition, and on January 15, 2010 the trial court dismissed the post-conviction petition. Ellis appealed the dismissal and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court. Ellis then filed a PLA relating to his post-conviction petition, which was denied on March 28, 2012. On January 17, 2013, Ellis filed the Petition in the instant action.
An individual in custody pursuant to state court judgment may seek a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides the following:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The decision made by a state court is deemed to be contrary to clearly established federal law "if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Emerson v. Shaw, 575 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2009)(quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). The decision by a state court is deemed to involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law "if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.'" Emerson, 575 F.3d at 684 (quoting Bell, 535 U.S. at 694).
This court has liberally construed Ellis' pro se filings. See Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 2004)(stating that "[a]s [the plaintiff] was without counsel in the district court, his habeas petition [wa]s entitled to a liberal construction"); Greer v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, Ill., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001)(indicating that a court should "liberally construe the pleadings of individuals who proceed pro se "). Ellis asserts in the Petition: (1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel (Claim 1), (2) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his appellate counsel on direct appeal (Claim 2), and (3) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his post-conviction counsel (Claim 3). (Pet. 5-6).
I. Claims 1 and 2 (Ineffective Assistance by Trial and Appellate Counsel)
Respondent argues that Claims 1 and 2 are procedurally defaulted and that there is no ...