OPINION AND ORDER
JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW, District Judge.
Plaintiff Carmen Carothers filed a five-count second amended complaint against the Office of the Transitional Administrator ("OTA"), Earl Dunlap, and Cook County (collectively referred to as "defendants") alleging sex, race, and disability discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). Before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss Carothers's second amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.
The OTA was created in 2007 in response to ongoing litigation concerning conditions at the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center ("CCJDC"). See Doe v. Cook Cnty., No. 99 C 3945. The court appointed Dunlap to serve as the transitional administrator to oversee the transfer of the CCJDC to the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County from the executive branch of Cook County. The OTA handles day-to-day operations of the CCJDC.
In 2005, Carothers began working at the CCJDC. In 2009, she was demoted from her position as supervisor to administrative analyst. Additionally, Carothers took medical leave after suffering injuries in connection with a physical attack by a resident of the facility. The CCJDC failed to reinstate Carothers after her leave without giving an explanation. Ultimately, in 2011, Carothers was terminated from the CCJDC.
On November 2, 2009, Carothers filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") naming the CCJDC as the respondent and alleging race, sex, and disability discrimination, and retaliation. On May 18, 2012, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to Carothers.
On August 17, 2012, Carothers filed suit against the CCJDC and Cook County. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice finding that the CCJDC was not a suable entity and that Cook County could only be held liable for indemnification purposes. On November 21, 2012, Carothers filed an amended complaint naming the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County and Cook County as defendants; however, this court again granted defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice because the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County was not a proper defendant. On January 22, 2013, Carothers filed a second amended complaint naming the OTA, Dunlap, and Cook County as defendants.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997). In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 486 (7th Cir. 2002). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim's basis, but must also establish that the requested relief is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At the same time, the plaintiff need not plead legal theories. Hatmaker v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010). Rather, it is the facts that count.
Defendants argue that Carothers's second amended complaint should be dismissed because (1) it is untimely and does not relate back to the filing of her initial complaint; and (2) Carothers failed to name the OTA and Dunlap in her EEOC charge.
A. Whether Carothers's Second Amended Complaint Was Timely Filed
Defendants argue that Carothers failed to name the OTA and Dunlap as defendants within 90 days of receiving her right-to-sue letter and that her second amended complaint does not relate back to the initial complaint filed within that 90-day window.
Litigants alleging Title VII and ADA violations have 90 days to bring suit after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Lee v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 635 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2011); Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2009). Carothers complied with this 90-day filing mandate as she initially filed suit on August 17, 2012 within three months of receipt of her right-to-sue letter. The initial complaint, however, named the CCJDC and Cook County as ...