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Shelton v. Phillips

United States District Court, Seventh Circuit

June 25, 2013

PAUL SHELTON Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL PHILIPS and JOHN DOE Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES B. ZAGEL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Paul Shelton, pro se, a licensed attorney, filed a ten-count Complaint against DuPage County Deputy Sheriff Michael Phillips and a John Doe defendant, also alleged to be a DuPage County Deputy Sheriff, each in their individual and official capacities. Counts I through IV allege Fourth Amendment violations for unreasonable search and seizure of Plaintiff's person and effects. Count V alleges a violation of Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Count VI alleges a Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of property without due process. Counts VII-X are related state law tort claims. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and seeks money damages. Defendants Phillips and Doe now move to dismiss Shelton's Complaint. For the reasons stated, the motion to dismiss counts I through VI is GRANTED, and I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of the remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3). Consequently, the case is dismissed in its entirety.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Shelton alleges that on February 5, 2013 he was exiting a courtroom in the DuPage County Courthouse in his capacity as attorney when defendant Deputy Sheriffs of DuPage County, Phillips and Doe, refused to allow him to leave and moved him to a conference room adjacent to the courtroom. Shelton claims he informed Phillips and Doe that he was en route to another hearing at the Kane County Courthouse, but was ordered by Phillips to "face the wall, spread your legs, and place your hands on the wall." Shelton alleges he was frisked and all items were removed from his clothing, including a "DuPage County Attorney's I.D. card, " then handcuffed and walked through the public hallways down to the basement of the courthouse. Shelton claims he was never presented with an arrest order or informed as to the charge or identity of the complainant. Shelton further alleges he was asked "several questions" by Phillips and informed he would need to post a $7, 000 cash bond in order to be released. Shelton contends his arrest on February 5, 2013, was in violation of Illinois law 705 I.L.C.S. §205/9 and 725 I.L.CS. §5/107-7(d), which provides an exemption from arrest for attorneys while attending court or going to or returning from court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss challenges the sufficiency of a complaint. To adequately state a claim, the complaint must provide "a short and plain statement" showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a claim must be "facially plausible, " meaning the complaint must contain enough "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

When considering whether to grant a motion a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007). However, "legal conclusions and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth." McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Counts I-IV - Fourth Amendment Claims Against Phillips and Doe

In counts I-IV, Mr. Shelton alleges a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights from unreasonable search and seizure of his person, effects, and papers. Accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true, after detaining him in the conference room, Phillips informed Shelton that he would not be going to Kane County because he was "placing Shelton under arrest." Phillips further informed him that a judge signed the order "later determined to be a Writ of Body Attachment of Shelton's person". Mr. Shelton's Complaint does not claim false arrest, nor does it question the validity of the Writ of Body Attachment (an arrest warrant). Instead, he alleges that his detainment, search of his person, and seizure of personal effects was unreasonable given the privilege under Illinois law from arrest for attorneys attending court and while going to and returning from court.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for a civil action for constitutional violations such as unreasonable seizures. An arrest made with probable cause, however, is generally reasonable, and a valid Writ of Body Attachment issued by a neutral magistrate comprises sufficient probable cause. Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 713-14 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The existence of probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any § 1983 claim against a police officer for false arrest or false imprisonment."); Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims appear to rest on the argument that Defendants' alleged failure to comply with an Illinois statute that provides limited arrest exemptions rendered his seizure unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment. That is incorrect. An arrest is not rendered unreasonable under the Fourth amendment because it entails a violation of state law. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003); Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The federal government is not the enforcer of state law."). In Thompson v. City of Chicago, police officers were sued for violating the deceased plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in using excessive force during an arrest following a high-speed chase. 472 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs in that case alleged police did not follow department general orders on the use of force during arrest and sought to enter the department policy into evidence. Id. In affirming the inadmissibility of the general orders, the court held "the violation of police regulations or even a state law is completely immaterial as to the question of whether a violation of the federal constitution has been established." Id. at 454 (emphasis added).

The Complaint contains no other facts to suggest that Plaintiff's arrest was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment beyond the alleged violation of Illinois law. Consequently, counts I-IV against Phillips and Doe do not ...


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