MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JOHN W. DARRAH, District Judge.
Plaintiff Jose Lopez ("Lopez") sued Defendants Ram Shirdi, Inc. ("Shirdi") and American Hotel Partners, Inc. ("AHP") (collectively, the "Defendants"), alleging retaliation and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/6-101, et seq. ("IHRA"), the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ("FLSA"), and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 105/1, et seq. ("IMWL"), for failure to pay overtime wages. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Local Rule 56.1
Defendants have failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 for the Northern District of Illinois ("Local Rule"), in filing their Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposing Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the party moving for summary judgment to provide "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law." Defendants failed to file a Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of facts with their Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants have attached exhibits to their Motion. ( See Dkt. No. 124.)
Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) requires the nonmoving party to admit or deny each factual statement proffered by the moving party and to concisely designate any material facts that establish a genuine dispute for trial. See Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). In filing their "response" to Plaintiff's statement of facts, Defendants inexplicably restate each of Plaintiff's statements of fact. ( See Dkt. No. 125-2.) Accordingly, because Defendants have failed to dispute Plaintiff's statements of fact and, instead, have adopted them as their own, Plaintiff's statements of fact are deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment.
Lopez worked at a Motel 6 in Calumet Park, Illinois ("Motel 6"); the Motel 6 was operated and owned by Shirdi and AHP. ( Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff was terminated from his employment at Motel 6 in March 2010, after speaking out against the alleged sexual harassment of female employees at Motel 6. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56-63.)
In Count I, Plaintiff brings a claim for retaliation under Title VII and the IHRA. In Count II, Plaintiff brings a claim for violation of the overtime provisions of the FLSA. In Count III, Plaintiff brings a claim for violation of the overtime provisions of the IMWL.
Plaintiff appeared on Defendants' payroll records from October 10, 2009 to February 28, 2010. (Pl.'s 56.1(a)(3) ¶ 1.) Shirdi and AHP were responsible for the supervision and enforcement of personnel policies working at the Motel 6. ( Id. ¶ 4.) In 2009, Shirdi and AHP filed separate federal income tax returns. ( Id. ¶ 5.)
Defendants employed fifteen or more employees in at least 34 weeks in 2009. ( Id. ¶ 6.) Defendants employed fifteen or more employees in at least 48 weeks in 2010. ( Id. ) Defendants' payroll records demonstrate that from July 24, 2009, to December 4, 2011, Defendants employed over fifteen employees during each calendar week. ( Id. ¶ 8.)
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on conclusory pleadings but "must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial." Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986)). A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment, nor is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Robin v. Espo Eng. Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal ...