MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CLIFFORD J. PROUD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff Jessica McWhorter Tego, through counsel, seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
A. Procedural History
Ms. Tego applied for benefits in March, 2006, alleging disability beginning on December 31, 2005. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. After holding a hearing, an ALJ denied the application in August, 2009. (Tr. 75-84). The Appeals Council granted review and vacated the decision. (Tr. 86-89). The case was then assigned to ALJ Stuart T. Janney. After holding another hearing, ALJ Janney denied the application on November 2, 2010. (Tr. 22-37). The Appeals Council denied review, and the November 2, 2010, decision became the final agency decision subject to judicial review. (Tr. 1). Administrative remedies have been exhausted and a timely complaint was filed in this Court.
B. Issues Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raises several points, including that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of the consultative examiner regarding her ability to crouch and crawl. Because of this error, she contends, the ALJ’s assessment of her residual functional capacity was not supported by substantial evidence.
C. Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for DIB or SSI, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the applicable statutes. For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A).
A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(3).
“Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained this process as follows:
The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. The second step evaluates whether an alleged physical or mental impairment is severe, medically determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third step compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are considered conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, then the applicant is considered disabled; if the impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the evaluation continues. The fourth step assesses an applicant's residual functional capacity (RFC) and ability to engage in past relevant work. If an applicant can engage in past relevant work, he is not disabled. The fifth step assesses the applicant's RFC, as well as his age, education, and work experience to determine whether the applicant can engage in other work. If the applicant can engage in other work, he is not disabled.
Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that is serious; (3) whether the impairments meet or equal one of the listed impairments acknowledged to be conclusively disabling; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work within the economy, given his or her age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 512-513 (7th Cir. 2009); Schroeter v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1992).
If the answer at steps one and two is “yes, ” the claimant will automatically be found disabled if he or she suffers from a listed impairment, determined at step three. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment at step three, and cannot perform his or her past work (step four), the burden shifts to the Secretary at step five to show that the claimant can perform some other job. Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984). See also, Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001)(Under the five-step evaluation, an “affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled…. If a claimant reaches step 5, the burden shifts to the ALJ to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy.”).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the decision is supported by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made. The scope of review is limited. “The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must determine not whether Ms. Tego was, in fact, disabled during the relevant time period, but whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether any errors of law were made. See, Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995)). This Court uses the Supreme Court’s definition of substantial evidence, i.e., “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
In reviewing for “substantial evidence, ” the entire administrative record is taken into consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1997). However, while judicial review is deferential, it is not abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See, Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.
D. The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Janney followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He determined that Ms. Tego had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date and that she was insured for DIB through December 31, 2009. He found that plaintiff had severe impairments of status post Burkitt lymphoma, obesity, hernia, diabetes, congestive heart failure, degenerative changes in the knee, degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine, depression, and anxiety. He found that these impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment.
The ALJ found that Ms. Tego had the residual functional capacity to perform work at the sedentary exertional level, with limitations. The ALJ determined that Ms. Tego could not do her past work, but, based on evidence from a vocational expert, he concluded that she was able to do other jobs which exist in significant numbers in the regional and local economies. (Tr. 22-37).
E. The Evidentiary Record
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in formulating this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record is directed to the points raised by plaintiff.
1. Agency Forms
Plaintiff was born in 1980, and was 25 years old when she allegedly became disabled on December 31, 2005. She was insured for DIB through December 31, 2009. (Tr. 232). She said that she became disabled on December 31, 2005, because of Burkitt lymphoma. She had stopped working ...