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Doe v. Roe

United States District Court, Seventh Circuit

May 17, 2013

JANE DOE, Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN ROE, UNKNOWN OFFICERS, ROBERT GEDVILLE, and the VILLAGE OF JUSTICE, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Jane Doe has filed a nine-count Second Amended Complaint against Officer John Roe in his individual capacity, the Village of Justice ("the Village"), Chief Gedville of the Village police department, and unknown officers. Now before the court is the Village's motion to dismiss Doe's claims against the Village pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the court grants the motion in part and denies it in part. The motion to dismiss is denied as to Counts III-VII and IX. The motion to dismiss is granted as to Count VIII, and that count of the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court accepts the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true. Doe alleges that on May 5, 2012, she was waiting on the street for a cab when Roe stopped his Village police vehicle near her. Roe, clad in full uniform, questioned Doe and asked for her identification. He reported her name to the police dispatch operator. He then told Doe to get into the car, made her sit next to him, and told the cab that had just arrived to wait until summoned. Roe pulled into a poorly lit spot in a parking lot, walked around to the passenger seat, and forced Doe to perform oral sex on him.

Doe alleges she went to the Village police department the following day to report the assault. Chief Gedville told her to file her complaint with the Burbank Police Department. When she did so, the Burbank police contacted the Village police, who conducted an internal investigation and sustained Doe's complaint. Doe alleges that the Village should have known when it hired Roe that he was unfit for his position and would create a danger to the public. She further alleges that the Village breached its duty to train and supervise Roe.

Doe has sued Roe, along with Chief Gedville, the Village, and unknown officers. In Count I, Doe alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that by using his official authority to force Doe to perform oral sex on him, Roe violated Doe's substantive due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Count II, Doe alleges that Roe violated the Fourth Amendment by subjecting her to false arrest and unreasonable detention. In Counts III, IV, and V, she alleges that Roe committed assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), in violation of state law, and that the Village is liable for his acts pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Count VI seeks indemnification from the Village, pursuant to 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/9-102, because Roe committed the alleged acts in the scope of his employment with the Village. Count VII is a Monell claim against the Village, pursuant to § 1983, in which Doe alleges that the Village had informal policies, practices, or customs that proximately caused her injury. Those policies included "negligent hiring, " as well as:

a. allowing, encouraging and permitting its police personnel to conduct unreasonable searches and seizures of person and property, failing to train its police personnel to conduct reasonable searches and seizures of person and property, and/or failing to provide its police personnel adequate training to determine the presence or absence of grounds to conduct reasonable searches and/or seizures; negligently supervising its police personnel regarding searches and seizures;
b. allowing and encouraging the filing of false reports, and giving false statements and testimony about said searches and/or seizures;
c. failing to properly train, supervise, discipline, transfer, monitor, counsel and otherwise control officers in their employ particularly when for years, the Village has known its officers engaged in misconduct during searches and seizures of persons and property, including community caretaking functions and Terry stops;
d. promoting, advocating and/or allowing the police code of silence, where officers refuse to report or otherwise cover-up instances of police misconduct despite their obligations under the law and police regulations....

(Second Am. Compl. ¶ 63, ECF No. 17.) Finally, Counts VIII and XI assert state-law negligent hiring and retention and negligent supervision claims against Chief Gedville and the Village.

The Village moves to dismiss all claims against it in the Second Amended Complaint. As to Counts III, IV, and V, the Village argues that it cannot be liable for assault, battery, or IIED committed by Roe under the doctrine of respondeat superior, because Roe was not acting within the scope of his employment as a police officer when he committed the alleged acts. As to Count VI, the Village claims that it has no duty to indemnify Roe for any judgment entered in connection with the state law claims. As to Count VII, the Village argues that Doe's attempt to plead a Monell claim is insufficient to meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Finally, as to Counts VIII and IX, the Village claims that is immune under the Local Government and Governmental Employees' Tort Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/1-101 et seq., from claims of negligent hiring and retention and negligent supervision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) by providing "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must include "sufficient detail to give the defendants fair notice" of the claims alleged against them. EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). The complaint must also "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim satisfies this pleading standard when its factual allegations "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56; see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[P]laintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together."). For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court takes all facts alleged in the ...


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