Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Burke v. GODINEZ

United States District Court, Seventh Circuit

May 9, 2013

CALVIN BURKE, # B-60083, Plaintiff,


J. PHIL GILBERT, District Judge.

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in the medium security unit at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"), has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

This matter is before the Court on a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") brought by Plaintiff (Doc. 3). Plaintiff has also moved for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order ("TRO"). Each matter shall be addressed in turn.

Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP (Doc. 3)

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP in this case without prepayment of the Court's usual $350.00 filing fee in a civil case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a federal court may permit a prisoner who is indigent to bring a "suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, " without prepayment of fees upon presentation of an affidavit stating the prisoner's assets together with "the nature of the action... and affiant's belief that the person is entitled to redress." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In the case of civil actions, a prisoner's affidavit of indigence must be accompanied by "a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint..., obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner is or was confined." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Upon tender of a proper affidavit and certified copy of a trust fund account statement, a prisoner then is assessed an initial partial filing fee of twenty percent of the greater of: (1) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner's trust fund account; or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's trust fund account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the prisoner's suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A)-(B). After payment of an initial partial filing fee, a prisoner is required to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's trust fund account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of a prisoner must forward payments from the prisoner's trust fund account to the clerk of the district court where the prisoner's case is pending each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00 until the filing fee in the case is paid. See id. Importantly, a prisoner incurs the obligation to pay the filing fee for a lawsuit when the lawsuit is filed, and the obligation continues regardless of later developments in the lawsuit, such as denial of leave to proceed IFP or dismissal of the suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (e)(2); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997).

In this case, Plaintiff has tendered an affidavit of indigence that is sufficient as to form, but this is not the end of the matter. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a district court "shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The statute provides further that, "[o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint... is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915,

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Court documents are, of course, public records of which the Court can take judicial notice. See Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994). Review of documents filed in the electronic docket of this Court, and on the Public Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER") website (, discloses the following actions brought by Plaintiff while a prisoner seeking redress from officers or employees of a governmental entity that have been dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: Burke v. Snyder, et al., Case No. 03-cv-3024-HAB-BGC (C.D. Ill., dismissed July 20, 2004); Burke v. Montgomery Cnty. Jail, Case No. 12-cv-253 (M.D. Tenn., dismissed March 13, 2012); Burke v. Montgomery Cnty. Jail, Case No. 12-cv-293 (M.D. Tenn., dismissed March 28, 2012).[1] Because Plaintiff has three "strikes" for purposes of § 1915(g), he may not proceed IFP in this case unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Notably, Plaintiff neglected to mention any of these previously-filed actions in his complaint. A plaintiff's failure to disclose his litigation history, particularly when he seeks to proceed IFP, may be grounds for immediate dismissal of the suit. Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2008) (termination of the suit is an appropriate sanction for struck-out prisoner who took advantage of court's oversight and was granted leave to proceed IFP); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999) (litigant who sought and obtained leave to proceed IFP without disclosing his three-strike status committed a fraud upon the court); see also Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2011) (dismissal appropriate where Court-issued complaint form clearly warned Plaintiff that failure to provide litigation history would result in dismissal). At this juncture, the record does not clearly indicate that dismissal is appropriate. However, Plaintiff is ADVISED that if he brings any future lawsuit while he is a prisoner, he must inform the Court of his prior cases which have been dismissed pursuant to § 1915A, whether or not he uses a Court-issued complaint form. Further, Plaintiff must still satisfy the requirements of § 1915(g) if he is to proceed in this action.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that "imminent danger" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) requires a "real and proximate" threat of serious physical injury to a prisoner. Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2002)). In general, courts "deny leave to proceed IFP when a prisoner's claims of imminent danger are conclusory or ridiculous." Id. at 331 (citing Heimermann v. Litscher, 337 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 2003)). Additionally, "[a]llegations of past harm do not suffice" to show imminent danger; rather, "the harm must be imminent or occurring at the time the complaint is filed, " and when prisoners "allege only a past injury that has not recurred, courts deny them leave to proceed IFP." Id. at 330 (citing Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1996)).

In this case, Plaintiff's first claim alleges he was denied due process by the Prisoner Review Board, which delayed action on his case for over seven months (Doc. 1, pp. 7-13; Doc. 2, pp. 2-6). Plaintiff admits to having committed several offenses in Tennessee, beginning in December 2011. However, Illinois officials did not revoke his parole until August 2012, when he was returned to custody in Illinois. He is seeking damages for this delay and the resulting additional incarceration (Doc. 1, pp. 23, 26-27). Clearly, this claim does not include any suggestion of physical danger, imminent or otherwise.

The complaint then alleges that Plaintiff received verbal threats from two Menard correctional officers, which have caused him to fear that he is in danger of physical harm or death. On February 8, 2013, Plaintiff was on a work detail in the maximum security area of Menard, which had been recently placed on lockdown. Defendant Tourville thought Plaintiff was staring at him, so he told Plaintiff, "If you f**ing hit me I will kill you, " then insisted Plaintiff repeat back to him, "Yes, I understand you will f**ing kill me" (Doc. 1, p. 15-16; Doc. 2, pp. 9-13; 18-19). He does not describe any further encounters with Defendant Tourville. He filed an emergency grievance over this encounter, which was deemed not to be an emergency by Defendant Warden Harrington (Doc. 1, p. 17).

On March 26, 2013, Defendant Willborn told Plaintiff, "Snitches get stitches" (Doc. 1, p. 14-15; Doc. 2, p. 8). Plaintiff took this as a threat of physical harm. Prior to this exchange, Plaintiff had filed a grievance accusing Defendant Willborn of giving tobacco (which is contraband) to inmate porters. Id. Another prisoner told Plaintiff he had heard two other inmates talking about Plaintiff's indirect accusation against the porters (Doc. 2, p. 8).

Finally, Plaintiff complains that as a result of other grievances he filed over his "false imprisonment" and other prison conditions (Doc. 1, p. 19), he was given a "corrected [sentence] calculation sheet" on March 7, 2013, that showed his projected release date as July 22, 2013 (Doc. 1, p. 21; Doc. 2, pp. 15, 27, 29). This added almost two months to his prison time, as he had been previously told he would be released on May 29, 2013. He concludes that this action was taken in retaliation for his protected activity of filing grievances and acting as a "jailhouse ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.