Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

The People of the State of Illinois v. Terrence Kendrick

May 7, 2013

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
TERRENCE KENDRICK,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.



Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 07 CR 4556 Honorable Domenica A. Stephenson, Judge Presiding.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Quinn

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Connors and Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant Terrence Kendrick was convicted of the aggravated criminal sexual assault of 16-year-old K.C. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to an extended-term sentence of 45 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court failed to adequately question prospective jurors pursuant to the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1, 1997); and (2) the admission of testimony from a forensic analyst who relied on a DNA report prepared by a non-testifying third-party analyst violated his confrontation clause rights according to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). On December 8, 2010, this court affirmed the trial court in People v. Kendrick, No. 09-0120 (2010) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On January 30, 2013, our supreme court denied defendant's petition for leave to appeal and entered a supervisory order, directing this court to vacate our previously entered order and reconsider our decision in light of their decision in People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534. People v. Kendrick, No. 111705 (Ill. Jan. 30, 2013) (supervisory order). We have vacated our previous order and again affirm the circuit court.

¶ 2 The evidence adduced at trial revealed that in the early morning hours of September 14, 2003, the victim was walking home from a party when defendant approached her from behind, put something against her back, and forced her into a car. Defendant drove to an alley, parked the car, and sexually assaulted the victim. Once he finished, defendant opened the car door and told the victim she could get out. When the victim got out of the car, defendant asked her if she needed any money to get home. The victim declined the money and walked to a nearby hospital, where she provided a blood sample and a vaginal swab for a sexual assault kit (kit). Nurse Evangeline Mondala sealed the kit and placed it in a secure lock box in the emergency room. On September 20, 2003, Pacita DeJesus, an emergency room nurse, released the kit to Officer Charles Widestrom, an evidence technician with the Chicago police department, who inventoried the kit under a unique inventory number and placed it in a secure locker prior to sending it to the Illinois State Police crime lab the next day. The kit was subsequently sent to Orchid Cellmark, a DNA testing facility, and analyzed by Nicole Laurent, a forensic analyst. Laurent submitted a report to the Illinois State Police crime lab stating that the vaginal swabs from the kit contained two DNA profiles, that of the victim and of a primary male donor.

¶ 3 In 2006, defendant was convicted on an unrelated felony and, pursuant to a court order, was required to provide a blood sample for the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). Defendant's DNA was subsequently analyzed at the Illinois State Police crime lab and determined to be a match with the DNA profile from semen recovered from the victim's vaginal swabs. On February 8, 2007, the victim viewed a lineup and positively identified defendant as her attacker. Defendant was charged with several counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual abuse.

¶ 4 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude the testimony of Wanda Kuperus, a forensic scientist from Orchid Cellmark, whom the State intended to call as a witness to testify regarding that laboratory's DNA testing and analysis of the victim's sexual assault kit. Defendant argued that because Kuperus did not actually perform the DNA testing, her testimony would lack proper foundation and would violate his sixth amendment confrontation right. The trial court denied defendant's motion and ruled that Kuperus would be permitted to testify if the State laid a proper foundation for her qualifications as an expert and established that such testimony is relied upon in the DNA field.

¶ 5 At trial, Kuperus was accepted as an expert in the fields of DNA analysis and forensic biology without objection from defendant. Kuperus testified that Orchid Cellmark is an accredited laboratory and described the process of accreditation, proficiency testing, and technical review. Kuperus explained to the jury what DNA is, how DNA analysis is performed, and how DNA profiles are developed. Kuperus stated that the methods of DNA analysis used at Orchid Cellmark are generally accepted in the scientific community.

¶ 6 Kuperus testified that Orchid Cellmark was asked to perform forensic biology and DNA analysis on the victim's sexual assault kit, which arrived at Orchid Cellmark in a sealed condition on February 24, 2004. Kuperus used Orchid Cellmark's case file and report from the instant case during her testimony, without objection from defendant. Kuperus testified that the victim's DNA profile was developed from a blood standard that was included in the kit. According to Kuperus, the vaginal swabs from the kit were tested and found to contain a mixture of two DNA profiles, the victim's and a male donor's. Kuperus opined to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the bodily fluid from the male DNA profile was from semen. Kuperus stated that the DNA results generated by Orchid Cellmark were summarized in a report and submitted to the Illinois State Police crime lab. That report included the DNA profile of the victim and of the unknown male donor. Kuperus said that she technically reviewed that report prior to testifying and verified that a proper chain of custody was maintained over the evidence at all times and that the proper protocol was followed during the testing done by Orchid Cellmark.

¶ 7 Prior to cross-examination, defense counsel renewed his motion in limine regarding Kuperus's testimony based on a lack of foundation and confrontation clause grounds. The trial court again denied the motion, stating:

"[T]he State did lay a proper foundation insofar as *** Ms. Kuperus testified that all of the testing that was done is tests that are commonly recognized and accepted in the scientific community. So the foundation was laid. I don't feel that the State has to show that Miss Laurent is unavailable because you have the expert here who is available for cross-examination and you can confront her and cross-examine her. She's forming her opinion as her opinion not anyone else's opinion, it's her opinion based on notes from somebody else and those notes were made from tests that are commonly recognized and accepted in the scientific community. So I think the chain has been laid."

¶ 8 On cross-examination, Kuperus testified that she did not perform the actual laboratory testing on the victim's sexual assault kit and that Nicole Laurent was the analyst and Lewis Maddox was the reviewer in this case. Kuperus said that she did not retest the DNA but spent approximately five hours examining the data produced by Laurent. Kuperus testified that the presumptive acid photophase test was positive for semen and that a confirmatory test with a microscope was positive for the presence of spermatazoa. She also stated that although it is her opinion that the vaginal swabs from the kit contained two DNA profiles, she could not rule out the possibility of that there was an additional person's DNA profile on the swab.

¶ 9 The State's next witness was Gitana Wallace, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, who testified as an expert in DNA analysis without objection from defendant. Wallace used her case file notes during her testimony, also without objection. Wallace testified that she performed DNA analysis on defendant's buccal swab and developed a DNA profile that was suitable for comparison. Wallace stated that she then compared defendant's DNA profile with the male DNA profile identified by Orchid Cellmark on the victim's vaginal swabs and determined that the profiles matched. Wallace opined that the profile would be expected to occur in 1 in 1.2 quintillion black, 1 in 3.5 quintillion white, and 1 in 820 quadrillion Hispanic unrelated individuals and that her conclusions were within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.

¶ 10 The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The trial court denied defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative a new trial and proceeded to sentencing. In aggravation, the State presented defendant's three prior convictions for armed robbery and a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, as well as a victim impact statement. Following additional evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the court sentenced defendant to an extended-term sentence of 45 years' imprisonment. Defendant's motion to reconsider that sentence was denied. This appeal followed.

¶ 11 On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court failed to adequately question prospective jurors pursuant to the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1, 1997). That rule codifies the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in People v. Zehr that four inquiries must be made of potential jurors in a criminal case that " 'go[ ] to the heart of a particular bias or prejudice which would deprive [a] defendant of his right to a fair and impartial jury.' " People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 477 (1984) (quoting People v. Zehr, 110 Ill. App. 3d 458, 461 (1982)). Rule 431(b) provides:

"The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the defendant's failure to testify cannot be held against him or ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.