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Doe v. Lee

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois

May 6, 2013

JANE DOE, Plaintiff,

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For Jane Doe, Plaintiff: Arthur R. Loevy, Elizabeth C. Wang, Jonathan I. Loevy, Roshna Bala Keen, Vincenzo Field, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL.

For Young Lee, Forest Park Police Detective, Defendant: Gerald J. Sullivan, LEAD ATTORNEY, Law Offices of Gerald J. Sullivan, West Chicago, IL; John Francis Goggin, Terrence Raymond Goggin, Goggin & Associates, Oak Brook, IL; Terrence James Goggin, Goggin and Associates, Oak Brook, IL.

For Village of Forest Park, Defendant: Julie Ann Hofherr Bruch, LEAD ATTORNEY, O'Halloran, Kosoff, Helander & Geitner, P.C., Northbrook, IL; Benjamin Matthew Jacobi, O'Halloran Kosoff Geitner & Cook, LLC, Northbrook, IL.


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HON. RONALD A. GUZMAN, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff has sued the Village of Forest Park and one of its police officers, Young Lee, for their alleged violations of her constitutional rights, Title VII and the Illinois

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Gender Violence Act and for assault and battery. The Village has filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (" Rule" ) 56 motion for summary judgment on the claims plaintiff asserts against it. [1] For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.


In early February 2011, when plaintiff was nineteen years old, she started an internship with the Village of Forest Park Police Department. (Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. ¶ 1.) As an intern, she was supervised by Lieutenant Weiler, and spent half of her time observing various aspects of police work and the other half doing clerical work. ( Id. ¶ ¶ 4-5; Def.'s LR 56.1(a) Stmt., Ryan Dep. at 119-20; id., Weiler Dep. at 54.) Defendant Lee, who is a tactical detective, was one of the officers with whom plaintiff worked. (Def.'s LR 56.1(a) Stmt., Doe Dep. at 211; id., Lee Dep. at 6-7.)

Lee is also the program coordinator for the department's liquor enforcement program. ( Id., Keating Dep. at 62; id., Lee Dep. at 59-60.) As such, he recruited participants for alcohol stings, i.e., attempts by minors to purchase alcohol from liquor stores and bars. ( Id., Keating Dep. at 44-46; id., Lee Dep. at 61-62.) Sometime in late February or early March 2011, Lee asked plaintiff, and she agreed, to participate in the program. ( Id., Lee Dep. at 62-63.) In exchange, the Village agreed to reduce the amount she owed in parking tickets by $20.00 per sting. ( Id., Doe Dep. at 109-10.)

On March 30, 2011, plaintiff says that Lee, under the guise of performing an alcohol sting, took her to two bars, bought her alcoholic drinks, and when she was highly intoxicated, had sex with her without her consent. Defendant contends that Lee, with whom plaintiff had become friendly during her internship, invited her to go out after work, the two consumed some alcoholic drinks, though not to the point of intoxication, and later had consensual sex.

On April 8, 2011, plaintiff reported the alleged assault and quit working for the Village. This suit followed.


To prevail on a summary judgment motion, " the movant [must] show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). At this stage, we do not weigh evidence or determine the truth of the matters asserted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). We view all evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record as a whole establishes that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id.

In Counts I-III, plaintiff asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Village for violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Village can be held liable under § 1983 only if if there is evidence to suggest that the alleged constitutional violations resulted from the execution of one of its policies. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A " policy," in this sense, includes a practice so widespread and permanent that it has the force of law. McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000). The existence of a widespread practice can be inferred from evidence that policymaking officials knew

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about and acquiesced to the practice. McNabola v. Chi. Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 511 (7th Cir. 1993); see Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir. 2006) (" It is not enough to demonstrate that policymakers could, or even should, have been aware of the unlawful activity because it occurred more than once. The plaintiff must introduce evidence demonstrating that the unlawful practice was so pervasive that acquiescence on the part of policymakers was apparent and amounted to a policy decision." ). The Mayor of Forest Park has policymaking authority for the police department. See Park Forest Municipal Code § 1-4-3-1(B)(7), (C) (stating that the Mayor, as Commissioner of the Department of Public Affairs, " shall have jurisdiction and supervision of the police department" and " shall make and enforce such rules and regulations . . . as may be necessary to secure [its] efficient conduct" ); see also Waters v. City of Chi., 580 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (" State or local law determines whether a person has policymaking authority for purposes of ...

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