The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Virginia M. Kendall
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Frances Gates, individually and as administrator for the estate of Olin Eugene Armstrong, Pati Hensley, Sara Hensley and Jan Smith (together "Plaintiffs" or "Gates Plaintiffs") have filed in this district for turnover of assets contained in certain accounts of third party AT&T Corp. (the "Accounts") in satisfaction of a judgment obtained by the Gates Plaintiffs against the Syrian Arab Republic ("Syria") in the District of Columbia. Scott Baker and several other individuals, plaintiffs in related action 11 C 8913, Patrick Scott Baker, et al. v. Syrian Arab Republic et al. (the "Baker Plaintiffs") also recorded judgment in this district for turnover the Accounts in satisfaction of the Baker Plaintiffs' judgment against Syria, also in the District of Columbia. The Baker Plaintiffs now move for reconsideration of the order of this Court dated September 28, 2012 Order and March 7, 2012 on grounds that this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the fate of the Accounts because the parties have recently discovered that the Accounts may in fact be located in New York, not Illinois as previously believed. For the reasons stated herein, the Baker Plaintiffs' Motion is denied.
On December 8, 2011, the Gates Plaintiffs registered their judgment in this district, and served a citation to discover assets on JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPMCB"), which citation uncovered the Accounts. On December 15, 2011, the Baker Plaintiffs registered their judgment in this district as well. On February 13, 2012, the Baker Plaintiffs intervened in the Gates Plaintiffs' action in order to establish the relative priority of the parties' judgment claims to any funds recovered through the actions. On March 7, 2012, the Court ruled that the claim of the Gates Plaintiffs has priority over the Baker Plaintiffs' claim (Docket No. 74).*fn1 In the March 7, 2012 Order, the Court determined that the claim of the Gates Plaintiffs had first-in-time right to the monies contained in the Accounts over the claim of the plaintiffs in related action 11 C 8913, Patrick Scott Baker, et al. v. Syrian Arab Republic et al. (the "Baker Plaintiffs").The Court also determined that Syrian Telecommunications Establishment ("Syrian Telecom"), to whom the monies in the Accounts are due and owing, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the SAR and thus is an "agency or instrumentality" of Syria for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §1610(g), and that the Accounts may therefore be properly attached in satisfaction of the Gates Plaintiffs' judgment. Finally,the Court denied the first motion for turnover of the funds in the Accounts - directed against JPMCB - because AT&T, the payee of the funds in the Accounts and the party with the ability to withdraw those funds, was the proper party against whom the Gates Plaintiffs must move.
In accordance with the direction of the March 7, 2012 Order, the Gates Plaintiffs moved for turnover against AT&T directly. In the September 28, 2012 Order, this Court ordered that the Accounts be turned over to the Gates Plaintiffs, following preservation of the rights of AT&T and JPMCB in an order mutually agreeable to those parties and the Gates Plaintiffs. On October 9, 2012, the Baker Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the March 7, 2012 and September 28, 2012 orders on grounds that the parties had only learned in the first week of October, 2012 that the Accounts and other assets described in the December 2011 response of JPMCB to citation to discover assets were, in fact, located in New York, not in Illinois as previous believed.
The March 7, 2012 order disposed of some, but not all, of the issues in this case. Therefore, the Baker Plaintiffs' motion is properly considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Reconsideration of an interlocutory order is appropriate where a court has "patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension." See, e.g., Mitchell v. JCG Indus., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Because the Baker Plaintiffs move for reconsideration of the March 7, 2012 Order based upon the discovery of new information regarding personal jurisdiction that none of the parties knew at the time of the March 7, 2012 Order, such new evidence would be an error of apprehension by all parties, including the Court, and appropriate for consideration under Rule 54(b).
The specific assets at issue in the Motion for Reconsideration are accounts payable of AT&T located at JPMCB. The Baker Plaintiffs assert that the location of the assets should determine where the parties pursue their post-judgment proceedings. But there are two problems with this approach, each of which, standing independently, merits denial of the Motion to Reconsider.
First, post-judgment enforcement proceedings are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69. Rule 69(a) requires that supplemental proceedings to aid execution of a money judgment "must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located." Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). In Illinois, 735 ILCS 5/2--1402 and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277 govern supplemental proceedings. See Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 629 F.3d 612, 622 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Supplementary proceedings are post-judgment processes that support the judgment creditor in asset discovery and final satisfaction of judgment."). Supplemental proceedings for post-judgment collection brought under Rule 69 and 5/2-1402 conform procedurally to Illinois law. Star Ins. Co. v. Risk Mktg. Group, Inc., 561 F.3d 656, 662--63 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Matos v. Richard A. Nellis, Inc., 101 F.3d 1193, 1195 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Rule 69 conforms collection proceedings to state law").
Accounts payable are not real property assets with corresponding in rem jurisdiction of their own. Accounts payable are intangible assets that are determined to be located in the domicile of the owner:
The general rule is that intangible personal property is "located" in its owner's domicile, In re Lambert, 179 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir.1999); Robertson v. Robertson, 803 F.2d 136, 137 (5th Cir.1986); Gordon v. Holly Woods Acres, Inc., 328 F.2d 253, 255 (6th Cir.1964), although there are exceptions, such as where the documents of title are in a state that is not the owner's domicile. First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Matheson, 187 Minn. 468, 246 N.W. 1, 3 (1932); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 63 (1971); 4A Wright et al., supra, § 1071, pp. 295--96. We have put "located" in scare quotes because intangibles, having no "body," have no spatial location. But creditors who want to file liens against intangible personal property have to file their liens in a place, or places, so the property has to be given a fictitious location. The owner's location is the sensible choice and the one made by the Uniform Commercial Code § 9--301(1); see Tenn.Code Ann. § 47--9--103, Official Comments on the UCC, § 5(a) (2000); Wis. Stat. § 409.103, Official Comments on the UCC, § 5(a) (2000). The owner's location is physical, not metaphysical, and is easily determined.
GP Credit Co. LLC v. Orlando Residence, Ltd.,, 349 F.3d 976, 979-80 (7th Cir. 2003). Under Illinois law, if the Illinois courts have personal jurisdiction over the party owning the debt, then Illinois courts have jurisdiction over accounts payable even if the accounts are "located" in another district. See Park v. Townson & Alexander, Inc., 679 N.E. 2d 107 (Ill. App. 1997) (allowing garnishment of accounts payable located in North Carolina because suit had been properly brought against defendant custodian of those accounts in Illinois). Once an Illinois court determines it possesses in personam jurisdiction over all interested parties, it may exercise control over assets of those parties outside of the jurisdiction of Illinois. See In re Marriage of Kosmond, 357 Ill. App. 3d 972 (1st Dist. 2005).*fn2 Under Illinois law service of a citation or garnishment on an Illinois branch of a bank ...