The opinion of the court was delivered by: Reagan, District Judge:
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center ("Lawrence"), brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is serving an eight-year sentence for burglary. His claims arose during his incarceration at Shawnee Correctional Center ("Shawnee"). Plaintiff claims that the five defendants, i.e., Pat Quinn (Illinois governor), Salvador A. Godinez (Illinois Department of Corrections director), Allan Martin (Shawnee warden), Alphonso David (Shawnee medical director), David A. Folsom (Shawnee sergeant), and several unnamed Shawnee medical staff members*fn1 violated his Eighth Amendment rights to adequate medical care and humane conditions of confinement (Doc. 1, pp. 4-6). Plaintiff asserts state law negligence claims against Defendant David and the medical staff members (Doc. 1, pp. 7, 11, 16). He also asserts a retaliation claim against Defendant Folsom (Doc. 1, p. 19). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.*fn2
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was diagnosed with disabling spine inflammation and arthritis in 2006, before he was transferred to Shawnee (Doc. 1, p. 4). While at other institutions, Plaintiff completed a course of physical therapy and received a lower bunk prescription (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5). Upon his arrival at Shawnee on November 30, 2011, Plaintiff sought diagnosis of and treatment for these conditions, to no avail (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff submitted multiple sick call requests, asking to see a doctor for his self-described "intense, very excruciating low back pain" (Doc. 1, p. 9). Defendant David never examined Plaintiff for spine inflammation or arthritis. He never ordered testing. He never referred Plaintiff to a specialist. He did not provide Plaintiff with a lower bunk prescription. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant David was negligent and deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs (Doc. 1, pp. 10-11).
Plaintiff's health deteriorated on January 15, 2012, when a cellmate beat Plaintiff in the head and ribs (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 11). Plaintiff began suffering from rib pain, blurry vision, migraines, and memory lapses (Doc. 1, p. 12). Despite his requests, Plaintiff could not get medical staff members or Defendant David to order any testing (Doc. 1. p. 13). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant David and these medical staff members were both negligent and deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 12).
Plaintiff's health deteriorated further in March 2012, after he was placed in segregation. Defendant Folsom forced Plaintiff to sleep on the cell floor (Doc. 1, p. 15). While sleeping there, Plaintiff was bitten by a spider once on his right forearm and three times on his lower right leg (Doc. 1, p. 16). Plaintiff's leg became swollen and painful. He had trouble securing medical treatment. Because of the delay, Plaintiff developed a staph infection, which caused permanent scarring (Doc. 1, p. 22). Plaintiff alleges that the medical staff members were both negligent and deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 12).
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Folsom violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights and retaliated against him for using Shawnee's grievance system to complain about the above-described incidents (Doc. 1, p. 26). Defendant Folsom wrote Plaintiff two disciplinary tickets, forced Plaintiff to sleep on the floor, forced Plaintiff to use the top bunk (which resulted in still another injury), threatened Plaintiff with the loss of personal property, and intercepted Plaintiff's mail (Doc. 1, pp. 19-26). Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment and retaliation claims against Defendant Folsom.
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
According to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the complaint. Accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has articulated a colorable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants David, Folsom, and the medical staff members (Count 1). Plaintiff has also articulated a colorable retaliation claim against Defendant Folsom (Count 2).
However, Plaintiff has failed to state an actionable constitutional claim against Defendants Quinn, Godinez, or Martin. The Supreme Court has held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money damages). There is no supervisory liability in a § 1983 action; thus to be held individually liable, a defendant must be "'personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.'"
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts which demonstrate that Defendants Quinn, Godinez, or Martin is "personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right." Id. In fact, Plaintiff makes no allegations against any of them in the body of the complaint. Plaintiffs are required to associate specific defendants with specific claims, so that the defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them and so that they can properly answer the complaint. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Where a plaintiff has not included a defendant in his statement of the claim, the defendant cannot be said to be adequately put on notice of which claims in the complaint, if any, are directed against him. Merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Defendants Quinn, Godinez, and Martin will be dismissed from this action without prejudice.
As for Defendant David and the medical staff members, Plaintiff also raises a negligence (i.e., medical malpractice) claim, based on the same conduct detailed above (Count 3). A defendant can never be held liable under § 1983 for negligence. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1995). However, where a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action such as a § 1983 claim, it also has supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), so long as the state claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" with the original federal claims. Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008). "A loose factual connection is generally sufficient." Houskins v. Sheahan,549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995)).
While this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over these state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this is not the end of the matter.
Under Illinois law, a Plaintiff "[i]n any action, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, in which the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries or death by reason of medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice," must file an affidavit along with the complaint, declaring one of the following: 1) that the affiant has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with a qualified health professional who has reviewed the claim and made a ...