The opinion of the court was delivered by: Herndon, Chief Judge:
This Â§ 2254 habeas case comes before the Court on respondent's motion to dismiss. The motion ripened on November 15, 2012, with petitioner's response. (Doc. 26). For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion (Doc. 24).
BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2002, pro se petitioner William Dale Carter was convicted of home invasion in the Circuit Court of Adams County, Illinois. (Case No. 01-CF-458). He was sentenced to a twenty-year prison term. This habeas case, which Carter brings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Â§ 2254, is premised on two claims: (1) that his mandatory supervised release term from that conviction is invalid, and (2) that the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) has improperly (and in spite of the jury in Case No. 01-CF-458 finding Carter not guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault) designated him a sex offender. Carter filed the petition in this case in February 2012.
Almost seven months prior, Carter had filed a habeas petition in the Central District of Illinois. (See Carter v. Gaetz, No. 11--cv--03173-RM). That petition, like this one, relates to Carter's conviction and sentence in Adams County Case No. 01-CF-458.
The instant motion targets Carter's petition with two arguments. First, respondent posits that, because Carter's challenge of his mandatory supervised release is a second or successive habeas petition, this Court has no jurisdiction over it. Secondly, respondent argues that (insofar as it challenges the IDOC's designation as a sex offender) Carter's petition should be dismissed because he has not exhausted administrative and state court remedies. The arguments will be taken in turn.
1. Second Successive Petition
Whether proceeding under 28 U.S.C. Â§ 2254 or Â§ 2255, a habeas petitioner must get permission from the Court of Appeals before filing second or successive petition in the district courts. 28 U.S.C. Â§ 2244(b); Altman v. Benik, 337 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 2003). See also White v. U.S., 371 F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Congress made parallel changes to Â§Â§ 2254 and 2255 to ensure that successive litigation would take place only under the most compelling of circumstances."); Nunez v. U.S., 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) ("No matter how powerful a petitioner's showing, only [the Court of Appeals] may authorize the commencement of a second or successive petition."). While not all subsequent motions are "second or successive" within the meaning of the statutes (for example, when they allege errors made in a resentencing that only came about because the Petitioner prevailed on an earlier habeas petition), they are second or successive when they challenge the underlying conviction. See Dahler v. U.S., 259 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2001).
Respondent points out-and petitioner does not dispute-that the June 2011 habeas petition filed in the Central District of Illinois concerns the same trial court judgment at issue here. A thorough check of the Central District's case filing records indicates that, indeed, Carter's June 2011 habeas petition concerns the same state criminal case as does this one: No. 01-CF-458, Circuit Court of Adams County, Illinois. (See C.D. Ill. Case No. 11--cv--03173--RM, Doc. 1; Id., ECF entry dated Aug. 15, 2011). An attack on his mandatory supervised release term is an attack on his sentence, since Illinois law requires a mandatory supervised release term be added at sentencing. See 735 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d). Carter may not challenge one aspect of his conviction in the Central District and another in this Court. His challenge to his mandatory supervised release fits the plain language of a "second or successive" petition, and he does not dispute respondent's assertion that he has not obtained permission from the Court of Appeals to bring this case. His challenge to his mandatory supervised release shall be dismissed. See Walker v. Roth, 133 F.3d 454, 455 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissal as successive is proper where prisoner seeks to challenge aspects of a previously-challenged conviction).
Insofar as this case is based on Mr. Carter's challenge to the mandatory supervised release from his 2002 Adams County criminal conviction, his petition must therefore be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Suggs v. U.S., --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 173969, at *2 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Without authorization from the court of appeals, the district court has no jurisdiction to hear the petition.").
The second claim in Carter's habeas petition is that, as the result of a "secret trial," the IDOC improperly designated him as a sex offender. Because he has not exhausted his available state court remedies pertaining to that assertion, his case is subject to dismissal here.
(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not ...