The opinion of the court was delivered by: J. Phil Gilbert District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Israel C. Ramirez's ("Ramirez") motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 2) to which the Government has responded (Doc. 8). For the following reasons, the Court denies Ramirez's § 2255 motion
On December 2, 2008, Ramirez entered an open plea of guilty to possessing over two tons of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On March 26, 2009, this Court sentenced Ramirez as a career offender to 300 months' incarceration, five years' supervised release, a $500 fine, and a $100 special assessment. Attorney John D. Stobbs ("Stobbs") represented Ramirez throughout these proceedings and on direct appeal. At sentencing, Stobbs failed to object to Ramirez's career offender classification.
On direct appeal, Stobbs initially filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief contending that he could not make a non-frivolous argument. The Seventh Circuit, however, denied Stobbs's motion to withdraw concluding that a non-frivolous argument could be made with regard to Ramirez's career offender classification. Stobbs then made the following arguments on appeal: (1) Ramirez's Texas domestic assault convictions were not divisible and should not have impacted his career offender status; and (2) If those convictions were divisible, the Court committed plain error when it sentenced Ramirez as a career offender absent a sufficient record to conclude the nature of the Texas convictions.
Ramirez's career offender classification depended on whether his two Texas domestic assault convictions were crimes of violence. The Texas statute under which Ramirez was convicted made it a felony to "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly" cause bodily injury to a family member. Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2) (1999). For purposes of the career offender guideline, a conviction under the "intentional" or "knowing" prongs of the statute is a crime of violence; however, a conviction under the "reckless" prong is not a crime of violence. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Texas statute under which Ramirez was convicted is divisible, meaning the court can consider certain underlying documents to determine under which prong Ramirez was convicted. See United States v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 397-98 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005)). The record, however, included only the Texas indictments and judgments which did not shed light on the nature of the conviction. Thus, Ramirez argued the Court committed plain error when it applied the career offender enhancement absent the appropriate record and he was entitled to be resentenced.
After briefing the matter, the Government confessed error and agreed that Ramirez should be resentenced. The Seventh Circuit, however, concluded that the record did not support a plain error finding and thus affirmed Ramirez's sentence. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit found Ramirez (1) failed to demonstrate that the presentence investigation report, which stated his Texas convictions appeared to consist of deliberate behavior, was incorrect; and (2) did not argue that the proper documentation would dispute the presentence investigation report. Accordingly, Ramirez failed to meet his burden of proving error.
In his instant § 2255 motion, Ramirez raises two grounds for relief. Ground one alleges ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase for counsel's failure to object to his career offender classification. Ground Two alleges ineffective assistance of counsel during the appellate phase for Stobbs' failure to obtain the appropriate underlying documents from his Texas convictions. The Government responded arguing that Ramirez's claim is not cognizable in a § 2255 motion. If the Court finds they are cognizable, the Government alternatively argues Ramirez's claim still must fail because he fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice under the Strickland standard.
The Court must grant a § 2255 motion when a defendant's "sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. However, "[h]abeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for extraordinary situations." Prewitt v. United States, 83 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996). "Relief under § 2255 is available only for errors of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude, or where the error represents a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Kelly v. United States, 29 F.3d 1107, 1112 (7th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted). It is proper to deny a § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing if "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively demonstrate that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see Sandoval v. United States, 574 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2009).
A defendant cannot raise in a § 2255 motion constitutional issues that he could have but did not raise in a direct appeal unless he shows good cause for and actual prejudice from his failure to raise them on appeal or unless failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); Fountain v. United States, 211 F.3d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 2000); Prewitt, 83 F.3d at 816. However, the failure to hear a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in a § 2255 motion is generally considered to work a fundamental miscarriage of justice because often such claims can be heard in no other forum. They are rarely appropriate for direct review since they often turn on events not contained in the record of a criminal proceeding. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504-05; Fountain, 211 F.3d 433-34. In addition, the district court before which the original criminal trial occurred, not an appellate court, is in the best position to initially make the determination about the effectiveness of counsel in a particular trial and potential prejudice that stemmed from counsel's performance. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504-05. For these reasons, ineffective assistance of counsel claims, regardless of their substance, may be raised for the first time in a § 2255 petition.
a.Ramirez's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims are Cognizable in a § 2255 Motion
The Government first argues that Ramirez's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable in a § 2255 motion. In support of its argument, the Government cites to an unpublished Northern District of Illinois § 2255 case in which the petitioner challenged the court's application of the sentencing guidelines. Pierce v. United States, Case Nos. 93-C-487 & 88-CR-823-1, 1993 WL 472894 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1993). In Pierce, the court dismissed the § 2255 petition, noting that the petitioner "failed to demonstrate the existence of 'extraordinary circumstances' or to convince the court that he is seeking relief from constitutional errors."
Pierce, 1993 WL 472894, at *4. Specifically, the court noted that the Seventh Circuit had not clarified whether there was a due process liberty interest in the ...