Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 11-CR-2102 Honorable Vincent Gaughan, Judge Presiding.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Connors
JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Quinn concur in the judgment and opinion.
¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant DeJuan Riley was convicted of possession of cannabis. The trial court sentenced him to two years' imprisonment and assessed nearly $1,200 in fines and fees, some of which were offset by credits. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to give him a $5-per-day credit for all of the days he spent in home confinement; and (2) assessing a fee for the DNA database despite the fact that his DNA had previously been collected. For the following reasons, we vacate in part and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 Defendant was convicted of possession of cannabis. He does not challenge his conviction on appeal. Rather, he challenges the fines and fees assessed at sentencing and the calculation of the credits to be applied to his fines.
¶ 4 During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that
defendant deserved a credit against his sentence for the 210 days*fn1
he spent on home confinement under the Cook County sheriff's
electronic monitoring program in addition to the 50 days spent in jail
while awaiting sentencing. The State objected, arguing that home
confinement should not be considered time "in custody" for which he
receives credit because he only had to wear an electronic monitoring
bracelet and did not have to comply with any reporting requirements.
The court ruled:
"[Electronic monitoring] alone is not required to be given credit. He had 50 days actually in custody. I'll double it for a total of  days credit and give him some credit for the [electronic monitoring]. He's not entitled to it as a matter of law."
The court then sentenced defendant to 2 years' imprisonment and 1 year of mandatory supervised release and gave defendant 100 days' credit toward his sentence pursuant to section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code of Corrections) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2010)). Additionally, the court assessed $1,190 in fees, fines, and costs and applied a $500 credit toward those amounts pursuant to section 110-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2010)), which represented a $5-per-day credit for 50 days of presentence incarceration and 50 days on home confinement.
¶ 6 On appeal, defendant first argues that he was entitled to the
$5-per-day credit for all 210 days that he was in "pre-sentence
custody" on home confinement, rather than the 50 days
awarded by the court. Significantly, defendant
acknowledges that he has "already completed his prison sentence" and
does not seek a credit against his sentence.*fn2 The
only relief he seeks on appeal is the award of the per diem monetary
credit against his fines, which is governed by section 110-14. In
response, the State argues that defendant is not eligible for any
monetary credit for time spent on home confinement because he was not
"incarcerated" as contemplated by section 110-14.
¶ 7 Accordingly, the question presented is one of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 243 (2008). Thus, we begin with the language of the statute to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting it. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d at 243. We give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning and consider them in the context provided. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d at 243.
¶ 8 Section 110-14 states:
"Any person incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against whom a fine is levied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit of $5 for each day so incarcerated upon ...