Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County. No. 11-DT-3971 Honorable Cary B. Pierce, Judge, Presiding.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Schostok
JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice McLaren specially concurred, with opinion.
¶ 1 Defendant, Ryan Mayor, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition to rescind the summary suspension of his driving privileges and from the court's subsequent order denying his motion for reconsideration. He argues that he is entitled to rescission because the Secretary of State erroneously imposed a three-year suspension after erroneously determining that he was not a " 'first offender' " under section 11-500 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-500 (West 2010)). We affirm.
¶ 3 Defendant was twice arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The first arrest occurred on September 9, 2011 (DUI No. 1). On October 27, 2011, defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of reckless driving, and the trial court entered an agreed order rescinding the summary suspension of defendant's driving privileges. Although the rescission was granted on October 27, 2011, defendant's official driving record on file with the Secretary of State showed that the rescission had an effective date of October 20, 2011.*fn1
¶ 4 Defendant's second DUI arrest (and the one at issue in this case) occurred on October 24, 2011 (DUI No. 2). Confirmation from the Secretary of State of the summary suspension resulting from DUI No. 2 was filed with the trial court on November 3, 2011. The Secretary of State's confirmation established that the summary suspension would begin on December 9, 2011, and would be in effect for three years. The confirmation further provided that defendant was not a first offender.
¶ 5 On November 3, 2011, defendant petitioned to rescind the summary suspension with respect to DUI No. 2. At the hearing on the petition, defendant argued that he was entitled to rescission based on the improper length of the suspension.*fn2 According to defendant, the Secretary of State incorrectly treated him as a second offender based on the prior summary suspension for DUI No. 1 and thus incorrectly suspended him for three years.
¶ 6 The trial court found that the length of a summary suspension was not a proper basis upon which to rescind a summary suspension. The court did not consider whether defendant was improperly considered a second offender.
¶ 7 Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, defendant timely appealed.
¶ 9 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that an allegedly improper length of a summary suspension is not a proper basis for rescission under section 2-118.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West 2010)). The State maintains that, because defendant's basis for rescission does not fall within the four statutory grounds for rescission, the trial court correctly determined that it was without authority to rescind the summary suspension.
¶ 10 When a defendant's driving privileges are summarily suspended as a result of the defendant's arrest for DUI (see 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2010)), the defendant may petition to rescind the suspension. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2010). The scope of the hearing is generally limited to the issues of whether: (1) the defendant was placed under arrest for DUI; (2) the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence; (3) the defendant, after proper warnings, refused to submit to testing; and (4) the defendant, after proper warnings, submitted to testing and the test ...