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Sylvester Jamision v. Superintendent Bryant

December 21, 2012


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Ronald A. Guzman


Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail, brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that Defendants, Superintendent Michael Bryant, Commander William Franko, Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, Lynette Taylor, and Dr. Carlos Quezada-Gomez, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by placing him in segregation without a proper mental health screening, not providing him proper mental health care while in segregation, and not holding a hearing on the disciplinary ticket that caused him to be placed in segregation. This matter is before the court for ruling on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.


Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In determining the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, a court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Weber v. Universities Research Assoc., Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2010). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The court does not "judge the credibility of the witnesses, evaluate the weight of the evidence, or determine the truth of the matter. The only question is whether there is a genuine issue of fact." Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).

However, Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Sarver v. Experian Information Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).


Defendants filed a statement of uncontested material facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 (N.D. Ill.). Together with their motion for summary judgment, Defendants included a "Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment." That notice clearly explained the requirements of the Local Rules and warned Plaintiff that a party's failure to controvert the facts as set forth in the moving party's statement results in those facts being deemed admitted. See, e.g., Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003).

Local Rule 56.1(b) requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to file:

(3) a concise response to the movant's statement that shall contain

(A) a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon, and

(B) a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.

L.R. 56.1(b).

The district court may rigorously enforce compliance with Local Rule 56.1. See, e.g., Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Because of the high volume of summary judgment motions and the benefits of clear presentation of relevant evidence and law, we have repeatedly held that district judges are entitled to insist on strict compliance with local rules designed to promote the clarity of summary judgment filings") (citing Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Serv., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004)). Although pro se plaintiffs are entitled to lenient standards, compliance with procedural rules is required. Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff failed to file a proper response to Defendants' statement of uncontested facts by not indicating which statements he agrees with and which he disputes. Some of the numbered paragraphs are copied verbatim with no comment and other numbered paragraphs contain different information that appear to dispute Defendants' statement of uncontested facts. Moreover, Plaintiff either fails to properly cite to the materials that support his disagreement with certain statements of undisputed facts (Dkt. # 48, ¶ 20), or he cites only generally to an exhibit with no particular page or paragraph number. (Id. ¶ 6.) Furthermore, only paragraphs 1-9 properly correspond to Defendants' statement of uncontested facts and Plaintiff provides only 36 total responses to Defendants' 80 statements of fact. The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff's responses and finds that none of the Defendants' statement of uncontested facts are properly disputed; accordingly, Defendants' statement of uncontested facts are deemed admitted.

However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will construe his filings broadly and consider factual assertions he makes in his summary judgment materials to the extent that he could properly testify about the matters asserted based on his personal knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 602.


Plaintiff has been a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Jail ("Jail") since November 16, 2009. (Defs.' 56.1(a)(3) Statement ¶ 1.) Plaintiff is currently housed in the Jail's Division 10, which is a medical division. (Id.). Tier 1A of Division 10 houses detainees who are in segregation as well as some in the general population and protective custody detainees. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was housed in Tier 1A on three occasions: from June 28, 2011 to July 6, 2011; November 23, 2011 to December 2, 2011; and December 8, 2011 to December 18, 2011. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff's complaint relates to his placement in Tier 1A from June 28, 2011 to July 6, 2011. (Id. ¶ 4.)

As noted above, Plaintiff names Superintendent Michael Bryant, Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, Commander William Franko, Lynette Taylor, and Dr. Carlos Quezada-Gomez as Defendants. Superintendent Bryant was a superintendent in Division 10 from December 2010 through August 2011. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff has never met Sheriff Dart and has no "complaints" against Sheriff Dart. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff never saw Commander Franko, a commander in Division 10, while Plaintiff was housed in Tier 1A between June 28, 2011 and July 6, 2011. (Id. ¶ 9.) Lynette Taylor is a Senior Mental Health Specialist in Division 10 and has been a mental health specialist at the Jail since 1992. (Id. ¶ 11.) Dr. Quezada-Gomez is a licensed clinical psychologist and the Mental Health Unit Director of Division ...

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