Name of Assigned Judge John J. Tharp Jr. Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
The plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 3), is granted. The court authorizes and orders correctional officials to deduct $3.99 from the plaintiff's account, and to continue making monthly deductions in accordance with this order. The clerk shall send a copy of this order to the Supervisor of Inmate Trust Fund Accounts at the Western Illinois Correctional Center. The complaint (Dkt. No. 1), is dismissed on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff is assessed a strike for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915(g). The clerk is requested to enter a Rule 58 Judgment in favor of defendants against plaintiff. Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 4), and any other pending motions are denied as moot. Civil Case Terminated.
O[ For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.
Pro se plaintiff Reginald Lacey, an Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) inmate, has brought a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court are plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 3), complaint for an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, (Dkt. No. 1), and motion for appointment of counsel.
The plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $3.99. The trust fund officer at the plaintiff's place of incarceration is authorized and ordered to collect the partial filing fee from the plaintiff's trust fund account and pay it directly to the Clerk of Court. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the plaintiff's trust fund officer is directed to collect monthly payments from the plaintiff's trust fund account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the account. Monthly payments shall be forwarded to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the full $350 filing fee is paid. All payments shall be sent to the Clerk, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois 60604, attn: Cashier's Desk, 20th Floor, and shall clearly identify the plaintiff's name and this case number. This payment obligation will follow the plaintiff wherever he may be transferred.
The Court is required to dismiss a suit brought in forma pauperis if it determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The following facts, drawn from plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1), are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are made in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 2001)). This Court also "construe[s] pro se complaints liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Obriecht v. Raemisch, 417 F.3d 489, 492 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008)).
"To satisfy the notice-pleading standard, a complaint must provide a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' which is sufficient to provide the defendant with 'fair notice' of the claim and its basis." Bridges, 557 F.3d at 545 (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S at 89). "'[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "The complaint must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bridges, 557 F.3d at 546 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The suit arises out of the revocation of plaintiff's mandatory supervise release (MSR) and return to prison. Plaintiff was incarcerated in the IDOC on a burglary conviction and released onto MSR in April 2011. His MSR was revoked and plaintiff was returned to prison because he committed a new crime while on MSR. Plaintiff counters that the alleged new crime is "bogus" because he has not yet been convicted on this charge. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5). He concedes that he has been before the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (PRB), but the Board has not yet come to a final decision due to the presently pending case. Plaintiff believes that he is now a pretrial detainee and cannot be held in the IDOC on the untried case.
As a threshold point, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), prohibit plaintiff from challenging his original conviction and sentence along with the adjudication by the PRB revoking his MSR. Heck prohibits a § 1983 suit if that case would result in a ruling that "'would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence' unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated." Edwards, 520 U.S. at 643 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). Edwards extended the Rule of Heck to prison proceedings. Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff's original sentence, along with the ruling from the PRB revoking the MSR, have not been overturned. Heck and Edwards therefore bars plaintiff from seeking monetary damages in the present suit to the extent that he is challenging his original conviction and sentence, and the PRB's revocation of his MSR. The Court cannot provide him relief that conflicts with these presently undisturbed rulings.
The Heck / Edwards bar would not apply to other actions such as the initial arrest by the parole agent prior to plaintiff's appearance before the PRB - an action that plaintiff also challenges. Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (explaining that Fourth Amendment claims such as false arrest are not barred by Heck). However, any portion of plaintiff's claims surviving the Heck / Edwards bar are meritless.
MSR is a mandatory requirement for prison sentences in Illinois. Illinois v. Horrell, 919 N.E.2d 952, 957 (Ill. 2009). A prisoner on MSR "remains in the custody of the Department of Corrections, [and] the time during which he can be legally detained does not expire until the term of MSR expires." Barney v. Prisoner Review ...