Name of Assigned Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss  by Individual Defendants Emanuel and McCarthy ("Individual Defendants") is granted. Because Plaintiff is pro se, his motions "For Relief and to Find for the Plaintiff"  and to "Move up Case in the Court's Docket and find for the Plaintiff"  were considered as briefs in opposition to Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss . Having granted Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff's motions [17, 23] are now terminated.
O[ For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.
According to his complaint, Plaintiff Vincent C. Piscopo was a Chicago police officer from August 1955 until sometime in 1961 or 1962 when he was "placed on total and permanent disability." Plaintiff's disability was caused by two accidents. On February 14, 1956, while patrolling Chicago Avenue on a three-wheeled motorcycle, a vehicle traveling at approximately thirty-five miles per hour struck Plaintiff from behind. He was thrown in air, landed painfully on the back of his motorcycle, and injured his sciatic nerve. After treatments and therapy, Plaintiff was able to return to light duty in the communications center, answering 911 calls and broadcasting on the north side's channel.
In 1961, Plaintiff was moved from light to regular duty. He was assigned to a "squadrol," a police wagon used for patrol, transporting arrestees, evidence, and, when necessary, bodies. On September 25, 1961, Plaintiff transported the body of a 300-pound woman to the morgue. Plaintiff and his partner moved the woman's body out of squadrol and onto a gurney at the coroner's office by themselves. Plaintiff's back immediately started to "throb and flare up in severe pain." Plaintiff had surgery, but he was unable to work again as a police officer due to his injuries. He still experiences severe back pain.
Plaintiff's pro se complaint is titled "BIAS & DISCRIMINATION" and asserts that the "Retirement Board of the Chicago Policeman's Annuity and Benefit Fund was biased and discriminated against [him] when they froze his pay scale - 3/4 pay at approximately $246 per month with no automatic (3%) compounded pension boost." Plaintiff also alleges "negligence and reckless disregard for [his] safety and rightful compensation under Illinois law." Individual Defendants have moved to dismiss.
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not to decide the merits of the case; a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court takes as true all factual allegations in Plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the claim first must comply with Rule 8(a) by providing "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), such that the defendant is given "fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Second, the factual allegations in the claim must be sufficient to raise the possibility of relief above the "speculative level," assuming that all of the allegations in the complaint are true. E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or a 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). However, "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (ellipsis in original). The Court reads the complaint and assesses its plausibility as a whole. See Atkins v. City of Chi., 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011); cf. Scott v. City of Chi., 195 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Whether a complaint provides notice, however, is determined by looking at the complaint as a whole.").
Individual Defendants' principal argument in support of their motion to dismiss is that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. The period of limitations, however, is an affirmative defense and "[c]complaints need not anticipate defenses and attempt to defeat them." Richards v. Mitcheff, 969 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff's complaint, therefore, cannot properly be dismissed based on a limitations defense under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. That said:
A plaintiff whose allegations show that there is an airtight defense has pleaded himself out court, and the judge may dismiss the suit on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). This comes to the same thing as a dismissal under rule 12(b)(6), and opinions, ...