The opinion of the court was delivered by: Proud, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff Sherry M. Moss is before the Court, represented by counsel, seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her Disabled Widow's Benefits (DWB).*fn1
Plaintiff filed an application for DWB in September, 2008, alleging disability beginning on July 2, 2008. (Tr. 154-155). The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. After holding an evidentiary hearing, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Stuart T. Janney denied the application for benefits in a decision dated January 29, 2010. (Tr. 19-29). Plaintiff's request for review was denied by the Appeals Council, and the January 29, 2010, decision became the final agency decision. (Tr. 1-6).
Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies and has filed a timely complaint in this court.
Issue Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raises the following issues:
1. The ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of her treating doctor, Dr. Davis, and failed to consider her impairments in combination.
2. The ALJ's assessment of her RFC was not supported by substantial evidence in that the ALJ rejected all medical opinions.
3. The ALJ improperly concluded that plaintiff was able to do her past work as a cook/bartender because that is a composite job.
4. The credibility analysis was faulty. Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for DWB a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the applicable statutes.*fn2 For these purposes, "disabled" means the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3). "Substantial gainful activity" is work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained this process as follows:
The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. The second step evaluates whether an alleged physical or mental impairment is severe, medically determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third step compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are considered conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, then the applicant is considered disabled; if the impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the evaluation continues. The fourth step assesses an applicant's residual functional capacity (RFC) and ability to engage in past relevant work. If an applicant can engage in past relevant work, he is not disabled. The fifth step assesses the applicant's RFC, as well as his age, education, and work experience to determine whether the applicant can engage in other work. If the applicant can engage in other work, he is not disabled.
Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that is serious; (3) whether the impairments meet or equal one of the listed impairments acknowledged to be conclusively disabling; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work within the economy, given his or her age, education and work experience. Schroeter v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1992); see also, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b-f).
This Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to ensure that the decision is supported by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made. The scope of review is limited. "The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must determine not whether Ms. Moss was, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether any errors of law were made. See, Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995)). This Court uses the Supreme Court's definition of substantial evidence, i.e, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
In reviewing for "substantial evidence," the entire administrative record is taken into consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1997). However, while judicial review is deferential, it is not abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See, Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.
ALJ Janney followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He determined that Ms. Moss had done some part-time work since the alleged onset date, but it did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity. She met the non-disability requirements for DWB, and the period of eligibility ends on October 31, 2014. The ALJ found that plaintiff had severe impairments of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), osteoarthritis, a history of methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and a history of Parvovirus infection. He found that her alleged anxiety was not a severe impairment.
The ALJ further determined that plaintiff's impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment. The ALJ found that Ms. Moss had the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of work at the light exertional level. Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded ...