Name of Assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge Amy J. St. Eve Sitting Judge if Other than Assigned Judge
The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant Alstom Power Inc.'s motion for summary judgment . Specifically, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment on Count III, but denies the motion as to Counts I and II.
O[ For further details see text below.] Notices mailed by Judicial staff.
On January 1, 2010, Plaitiff Gyptec Iberica ("Gyptec") filed a three-count complaint against Defendant Alstom Power, Inc. ("Alstom") alleging breach of contract, breach of the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code, and unjust enrichment. (R. 1, Compl.) Alstom moves for summary judgment on all three counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court grants the motion for summary judgment on Count III, but denies the motion as to Counts I and II.
"For litigants appearing in the Northern District of Illinois, the Rule 56.1 statement is a critical, and required, component of a litigant's response to a motion for summary judgment." Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 686 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2012). Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue." Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009). The opposing party is required to file 'a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.'" Id. (citing N.D. Ill. R. 56.1(b)(3)(B)). Pursuant to the Local Rules, the Court will not consider any additional facts proposed in the nonmoving party's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response, but must rely on the non-movant's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement of additional facts. See Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 2008).
Courtroom Deputy KF Initials:
Here, Gyptec did not file a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement of additional facts. Gyptec objects to certain facts in Alstom's Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts, but repeatedly fails to provide any reference to specific contrary evidence. (See e.g., R. 60, Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 13, 17, 23, 27.) The Court disregards Rule 56.1 statements and responses that do not cite to specific portions of the record, as well as those that contain factual or legal argument. See Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632 ("When a responding party's statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the moving party's statement in the manner dictated by the rule, those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion."); Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006) ("statement of material facts did  not comply with Rule 56.1 as it failed to adequately cite the record and was filled with irrelevant information, legal arguments, and conjecture"); Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2000) (the requirements for responses under Local Rule 56.1 are "not satisfied by evasive denials that do not fairly meet the substance of the material facts asserted").
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In determining summary judgment motions, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). After "a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party 'must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation omitted). "[D]istrict courts presiding over summary judgment proceedings may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, both of which are the province of the jury." Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704-05 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
"The dispute in this case involves Plaintiff's purchase of a rotary cutoff knife from the Defendant in May 2008." (Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 4.)*fn1 In or around September 2007, Gyptec contacted Alstom for a quote for a rotary cutoff knife. (Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 7.) On April 22, 2008, Alstom sent Gyptec an email with two documents attached: (1) a Pro Forma Invoice # 95017 ("Invoice") and (2) General Terms and Conditions of Sale ("General Terms"). (Id. ¶13); see also (R. 55, Def.'s Mem., Exs. 2, 7; Compl., Exs. A, B.) The Invoice describes the product, lists a unit price of $74,588 and a "lead time" of 18 weeks, and includes a term that payment would be "cash in advance via wire transfer." (Compl., Ex. A; Def.'s Mem., Ex. 2.) Gyptec received both the Invoice and the General Terms. (Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 17.) On May 7, 2008, Gyptec wired $74,588 to Alstom, which Alstom received on May 9, 2008. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) On May 9, 2008, after receiving the wire transfer, Alstom sent Gyptec an Order Acknowledgment with a copy of the General Terms attached. (Id. ¶ 23.) Alstom asked Dario Sandoval Forero ("Forero"), the Gyptec employee who facilitated the negotiation process, to provide an official purchase order acknowledging acceptance. (Id.¶24.) On May 13, 2008 Gyptec sent Alstom ...