Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge James F. Holderman than Assigned Judge
For the reasons set forth in the Statement section of this order, "Defendant Wallace's Motion to Dismiss'  is denied. Plaintiff Papastefan's Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint  though opposed  is granted. Third Amended Complaint to be filed by October 17, 2012. Defendants' Answers to Third Amended Complaint are due on or before November 16, 2012. Counsel for all parties are requested to meet pursuant to Rule 26(f) and jointly file a Form 52 on or before November 20, 2012. This case is set for a report on status and entry of a scheduling order on November 27, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. The parties are encouraged to discuss settlement.
O[ For further details see text below.] Notices mailed by Judicial staff.
In her three-count Second Amended Complaint and her proposed Third Amended Complaint, plaintiff Zofia Papastefan ("Papastefan") alleges that her former employer, defendant Triad Consulting Services ("Triad"), is liable for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count 1) and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count II), and that defendant Steve Wallace ("Wallace") is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") (Count III). Pending before the court is "Defendant Wallace's Motion to Dismiss," (Dkt. No. 19), in which Wallace argues to the court that Papastefan "has not and cannot plead a claim for IIED." (Dkt. No. 19 ("Def.'s Mot") at 2.)
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Fednav Int'l Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2010). The following background facts are therefore set forth as alleged in Papastefan's Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 18.)
Triad provides building maintenance services to businesses and government entities. (2d Am. Compl.
¶ 5.) In January 2007, Triad entered into a contract with the City of Chicago Department of General Services to provide custodial and janitorial services to City of Chicago facilities. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Papastefan was employed by Triad from January 1, 2007 through February 28, 2011. (Id. ¶ 8.) During this time period, Papastefan was assigned to perform custodial and janitorial services at the City Hall location. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 14.)
Triad did not provide changing rooms for its employees. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint" amends her allegations to state that Triad did not provide satisfactory changing rooms for its employees. This proposed change does not materially affect the allegations regarding Wallace.
Wallace, a City of Chicago employee with an office at City Hall, offered Papastefan his office as a private changing room, and Papastefan used Wallace's office from time to time for changing into her work attire. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 15-16.) While Papastefan dressed for work, Wallace secretly took seminude pictures of her with his cell phone. (Id. ¶ 15.) Papastefan became aware of the pictures in August 2010, when Sarah M. Hofsommer, a City of Chicago Investigator Specialist from the Inspector General's Office, "alerted her to the fact." (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.) Papastefan was forced to continue working at the City Hall location for the next six months, cleaning Wallace's office on a regular basis, before being suspended from her employment with Triad on February 28, 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 30.) Papastefan "did not welcome Wallace's harassment and found it to be horribly offensive." (Id. ¶ 18.) She was "devastated" when she found out about the seminude pictures Wallace had taken of her, and "suffered emotional distress as a result of [Wallace's] actions." (Id. ¶¶ 17, 48.)
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words, the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint is sufficient if it gives "enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together." Swanson v. Citibank, ...