The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sue E. Myerscough, U.S. District Judge:
Monday, 15 October, 2012 03:30:30 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his allegations of a pattern of false disciplinary tickets written against him.
The "privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court's sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them." Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis "at any time" if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court grants leave to proceed in forma pauperis only if the complaint states a federal claim. A hearing was scheduled to assist in this review, but the hearing will be cancelled as unnecessary.
To state a claim, the allegations must set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations must give enough detail to give "'fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" EEOC v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)(add'l citation omitted). The factual "allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a 'speculative level.'" Id., quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged . . . . Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555-56. However, pro se pleadings are liberally construed when applying this standard. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).
On September 9, 2011, Defendant Lambert wrote Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket for following a female therapist out of the gym. Lambert admitted to writing the ticket and told Plaintiff to stop "stalking" the female therapist. Plaintiff was found not guilty because video footage failed to substantiate Lambert's accusations.
Nearly a year later, on August 14, 2012, someone wrote Plaintiff another disciplinary report, accusing Plaintiff of insolence and disobeying a direct order. This incident arose from a missing deck of cards. A deck of cards had been stolen from Defendant Steffans, the recreational therapist. Steffans threatened to write everyone up if the deck was not returned. Plaintiff happened to have two decks of cards in his possession and offered to give Steffans one deck, in order to avoid being written up. Defendant Lambert again accused Plaintiff of stalking, though Plaintiff is not certain that Lambert is the one who wrote this second disciplinary ticket.
On the second disciplinary ticket Plaintiff was found guilty of manipulation and punished with 7 days of "close status," which, according to Plaintiff, meant being confined for all but three or four hours of the day, but he does not explain where he was confined. The writer of the second disciplinary ticket was never disclosed, and Plaintiff was not allowed to call any witnesses.
The procedural due process clause of the Constitution protects Plaintiff against "atypical and significant hardship" in relation to the "ordinary incidents" of Plaintiff's confinement. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2002). In other words, the punishment he suffered must have been severe enough to trigger procedural due process ...