The opinion of the court was delivered by: Samuel Der-yeghiayan, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendants' motions to dismiss certain claims. For the reasons stated below, the motions to dismiss are granted.
In her pro se second amended complaint, Plaintiff Lois Trask (Trask) presents a disjointed series of unrelated facts. Since Trask is proceeding pro se, the court will liberally construe her complaint. The court notes that on several occasions in these proceedings, the court offered to appoint counsel for Trask, and Trask indicated on each occasion that she wanted to continue to proceed pro se.
Trask makes various allegations in the second amended complaint relating to being arrested and detained. Trask contends that false statements were made accusing her of attempting to "gain access" to the chambers of a state court judge at the Daley Center in Chicago, Illinois (Daley Center) on July 12, 2010. (SA Compl. Par. 12A). Trask further alleges that she was arrested by Defendant Thomas Boyd (Boyd) for criminal trespass to land at the Daley Center. Trask contends that Boyd used excessive force when effectuating the arrest, and that due to Boyd's actions, Trask became "weak in the knees" and fell to the floor. (SA Compl. Par. 44). Boyd allegedly told Trask that if she did not get up, he would charge her with resisting arrest. Trask alleges that she was "attacked, battered, handcuffed" and taken to Defendant Northwestern Hospital (Hospital). (SA Compl. Par. 4D, 6A). Trask also contends that while being moved after her arrest, Boyd made her bump her head on the wall of an elevator. Defendant Donna Pickens (Pickens), who is a Cook County Sheriff's Deputy, allegedly retrieved documents left by Trask in a state court judge's clerk's office. Pickens also allegedly falsely accused Trask of being in a restricted area at the Daley Center.
Trask contends that when she was taken to the hospital after her arrest, Defendant Theresa Castro (Castro), who is a Sheriff's Deputy, "used excessive force on the plaintiff with her body while she handcuffed plaintiff to a wheelchair," and that Castro refused to let Trask use the toilet. (SA Compl. Par. 10). Trask claims that Castro conspired with Boyd and other Defendants "to receive overtime payment . . . ." (SA Compl. Par. 10A). Trask also contends that while Trask was being detained, Defendant Olivia Ortiz (Ortiz) "harassed" Trask and "refused to allow plaintiff to use the toilet." (SA Compl. Par. 13). Trask also claims that while at the Hospital, an unknown doctor falsified medical records to indicate that Trask refused medical services. Trask also claims that an unknown Defendant nurse gave Trask medication without a doctor's permission and conspired with others to have Trask "placed" in the Hospital "for no just cause." (SA Compl. Par. 21). Trask also contends that other treatment by staff at the Hospital violated her constitutional rights.
Trask also makes various allegations relating to certain proceedings in state court that have occurred since 1970, which Trask contends shows that there were "insufficiencies of the court and it's system. . . ." (SA Compl. Par. 4C). Trask references certain probate proceedings and alleges that she was "retaliated against by many judges, sheriffs and lawyers for her efforts Probate Case No. 02 P 2414 a case that Lois opened." (SA Compl. Par. 4). Trask contends that she was "not allowed to see or be with her father even after death. . . ." (SA Compl. Par. 4B). Trask also claims that she tried to see her father in February 2003, but that he was "tortured" and "tied down" and not allowed to see his children. (SA Compl. Par. 4E, 89A). Trask contends that Defendants conspired to cause her father's death. (SA Compl. Par. 89C).
Trask also references a wrongful death case in state court. Trask contends that Defendant Judge William Maddux (Judge Maddux) is a state court judge who made certain rulings in a "wrongful death case regarding the death of plaintiff's mother. . . ." (SA Compl. Par. 14A). Trask also refers to her mother's alleged "sudden death from the hands of unlicensed physicians. . . ." (SA Compl. Par. 89).
Trask also references divorce and child support proceedings in state court. (SA Compl. Par. 4D, 87, 98). Trask alleges that Defendant Judge Kathy Flanagan (Judge Flanagan) is a state court judge who made certain rulings that violated Trask's constitutional rights and that "all Social Security benefits for 8 years were not given to Lois because of the Conspiracy and Retaliation by Defendant Flanagan of the courts and it's Politics." (SA Compl. Par. 15C). Trask also contends that Judge Flanagan conspired with Judge Maddux to harm Trask. Trask further alleges that Defendant Judge Jennifer Duncan-Brice (Judge Duncan-Brice) is a state court judge who sat in stead of Judge Flanagan on one occasion and that Judge Duncan-Brice conspired with other Defendants in violating Trask's constitutional rights. Trask also alleges that Defendant Judge Kathleen Kennedy (Judge Kennedy) is a state court judge who used "prejudice ways to slander the plaintiff and keep her from receiving her ordered child support arrearage." (SA Compl. Par. 17A). Judge Kennedy also allegedly "has taken control of Plaintiff's business affairs without her consent and has the 1968 GMC School Bus in her control," and has "forbidden Plaintiff to receive all rights in her written and composed song 'IF YOU KNOW HOW I FEEL.'" (SA Compl. Par. 85). Trask also alleges that Defendant Judge James Riley (Judge Riley) and Defendant Judge Moshe Jacobius (Judge Jacobius) are state court judges who violated Trask's constitutional rights.
Trask also references certain eviction proceedings in state court. (SA Compl. Par. 99C). Trask alleges that Judge Maddux "has details . . . which influenced" police to "invade" Trask's residence several weeks after her arrest, "with weapons drawn and placing plaintiff and her family in a homeless situation. . . ." (SA Compl. Par. 61). Trask also alleges that Defendant Judge Mary Ellen Coughlan (Judge Coughlan) is a state court judge who "took the I.D. from the plaintiff in open court," conspired with other Defendants to "tear down the doors of plaintiff's parents home," and "conspired to have the plaintiff arrested and placed in a Mental Institution. . . ." (SA Compl. Par. 99B). Trask also names as a Defendant James C. Pullos (Pullos), an Assistant State's Attorney, who represented the state in certain prior proceedings in which Trask was involved and who is an attorney representing certain Defendants in this case. Trask contends that Pullos conspired to violate Trask's constitutional rights. Trask also contends that Pullos has a conflict of interest in this case.
Defendant James Adamson (Adamson) was allegedly an attorney who works for Defendant Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP (SMB) and allegedly represented Loyola Medical Center in a legal proceeding in which Trask was involved. Adamson allegedly conspired with other Defendants to "harm the plaintiff for standing up for her Rights." (SA Compl. Par. 97A-B). Trask also alleges with respect to certain proceedings in state court that Defendant Lawrence Helms (Helms), who allegedly works for SMB, "typed in a statement he wrote to the A.R.D.C. in an attempt to discredit Plaintiff. . . ." (SA Compl. Par. 75).
Trask also makes allegations relating to additional courtroom security brought in to supervise her in state court proceedings. Judge Maddux allegedly "allowed" six officers to stand behind Trask when she appeared at a court hearing, and Trask contends that she did not do anything to warrant such security precautions. Trask also contends that, when she appeared at other court hearings, Boyd, Castro, and Judge Flanagan also requested "extra security" to be present in the courtroom due to Trask's presence. (SA Compl. Par. 73).
Trask includes in her second amended complaint claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983) alleging that she was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment (Count I), claims alleging that her rights under the Illinois constitution were violated (Count II), and Section 1983 claims alleging unlawful arrest and unlawful restraint (Count III). Trask also includes in her second amended complaint state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, assault and battery claims, civil conspiracy claims, and fraud claims. (SA Compl. Par. 1, 51).
Defendants Judge Duncan-Brice, Judge Flanagan, Judge Maddux, Judge Kennedy, Judge Riley, Judge Jacobius, and Judge Coughlan (collectively referred to as "Judge Defendants") have moved to dismiss all claims brought against them. Defendants Thomas Dart (Dart), Boyd, Janice Prescott (Prescott), Andria Sims (Sims), Castro, Dickens, James Dillon (Dillon), Donnell Butler (Butler), Ortiz, Sherry Chatz (Chatz), and Pullos (collectively referred to as "Sheriff Defendants") have moved to dismiss certain claims brought against them. Defendants SMB, Catherine Basque Weiler, Alfred K. Murray, II, and Adamson (collectively referred to as "SMB Defendants") have moved to dismiss all claims brought against them. Helms has also moved to dismiss all claims brought against him.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (Rule 12(b)(1))requires a court to dismiss an action when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); see also Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995)(stating that when reviewing a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(1), the court "must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff"). When subject matter jurisdiction is not apparent on the face of the complaint and is contested, "'the district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint . . . to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1999)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting United Transportation Union v. Gateway Western Railway Co., 78 F.3d 1208, 1210 (7th Cir. 1996)). The burden of proof in regards to a Rule 12(b)(1)motion is on the party asserting that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)), the court must draw all reasonable inferences that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012); Thompson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff is required to include allegations in the complaint that "plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a 'speculative level'" and "if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court."
E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)(quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)); see also Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d at 622 (stating that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," and that "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference ...