Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge Ronald A. Guzman than Assigned Judge
For the reasons stated below, Haynes motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [1-1] is denied.
O[ For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.
Darek Haynes filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for dismissal of the indictment based on a purported violation of the Speedy Trial Act and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the district court's drug quantity determination. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is denied.
Haynes pled guilty to Counts One, Two, and Nine of the superseding indictment, which charged conspiracy to conduct and participate in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise, namely the Chicago Police Department, through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One), conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, namely 5 kilograms or more of mixtures and substances containing cocaine and mixtures and substances containing marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count Two), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of, and using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking crimes and crimes of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Nine). The Court imposed a sentence of 168 months each on Counts One and Two, to be served concurrently, and a term of 60 months on Count Nine, to run consecutively to Counts One and Two.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may move the court which imposed his sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence on the ground that it was "imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or is otherwise subject to collateral attack."
Haynes asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. A petitioner bears a "heavy burden in proving that [his] attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel." United States v. Holland, 992 F.2d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1993). To prevail, the petitioner must establish that: (1) his attorney's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"; and (2) his defense was prejudiced by this deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The petitioner bears the burden of both proof and persuasion that her counsel "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment . . . [and] that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." United States v. Davenport, 986 F.2d 1047, 1049 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The Strickland test also applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 789--90 (7th Cir. 2000). Courts must presume that counsel is effective. Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011).
Trial Counsel. Haynes contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the indictment because of a purported violation of the Speedy Trial Act due to a delay between the time he was arrested and the time he was indicted. The Speedy Trial Act provides in relevant part that "[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of a offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). It further states that:
[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or
at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the
Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). This subsection also states that no period of delay is excludable unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Id. The Speedy Trial Act requires the court "to put on the record its reasons for finding the continuance warranted[;] ... it does not require that the court recite ...