Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Alejandro A. Salazar v. W.A. Sherrod

August 31, 2012

ALEJANDRO A. SALAZAR, PETITIONER,
v.
W.A. SHERROD, RESPONDENT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Wilkerson, Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is petitioner Alejandro A. Salazar's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner shall be delivered to the United States District Court for the District of Kansas for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2004, petitioner Alejandro A. Salazar pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of over 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). United States v. Salazar, Case No. 04-20013-JWL, 2008 WL 1792188 (D. Kan. April 18, 2008). On August 23, 2004, the trial court sentenced Salazar to a term of imprisonment of 262 months. Salazar's sentence was enhanced because the trial court found him to be a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.*fn1 The Court considered a prior conviction in Missouri for involuntary manslaughter to be a violent felony that served as a predicate offense for the career offender enhancement. Id.

Salazar appealed his conviction and sentence arguing that his prior conviction for involuntary manslaughter was not a crime of violence that could be used to enhance his sentence. *fn2 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding that Salazar's involuntary manslaughter conviction was a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Salazar, 149 F. App'x 816 (10th Cir. 2005). The Tenth Circuit, however, remanded for resentencing on the basis of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

On remand, the trial court re-imposed the 262-month term of imprisonment. On appeal, the government filed a motion to enforce the appeal waiver in Salazar's plea agreement.*fn3 Because the question whether his prior conviction was a crime of violence under the Guidelines was resolved against Salazar in the first appeal, the Tenth Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. United States v. Salazar, 188 F. App'x 787 (10th Cir. 2006).

In 2007, Salazar filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the trial court. He raised two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that he entered into the plea agreement based on the representation of his attorney that he would not be sentenced as a career offender under the Guidelines, and that his attorney should have argued at resentencing that the career offender enhancement was precluded by Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). The trial court denied relief on the basis that the exception to the waiver in the plea agreement was applicable only to direct appeal, not collateral review. Even so, the trial court considered, but denied, Salazar's ineffective assistance claims on the merits. United States v. Salazar, Case No. 04-20013-JWL, 2008 WL 1792188 (D. Kan. April 18, 2008). Both the trial court and the Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. United States v. Salazar, 311 F. App'x 110 (2009).

In April 2009, Salazar filed a motion for a writ of audita querela in the trial court arguing that the career offender status used to enhance his sentence was unlawful under Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), which held that driving under the influence of alcohol was not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (Doc. 1). The government filed a response in opposition to the writ, arguing that Salazar's petition was barred by the waiver in his plea agreement, that it was an improperly-filed second or successive 2255 motion, that Begay did not apply retroactively on collateral review, and that Begay was inapplicable because Salazar was convicted of manslaughter, which is an offense enumerated in application note to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), which defines "crime of violence," and therefore the "otherwise" clause construed in Begay did not apply to Salazar's sentence (Doc. 3). In July 2009, the government filed a motion to amend its response to withdraw its retroactivity argument, indicating that Department of Justice had issued guidance contrary to the argument. The Respondent acknowledged Begay's retroactivity (Doc. 6).

The trial court evaluated Salazar's petition for writ of audita querela on its merits. The court found that Salazar's plea waiver "clearly encompasses Mr. Salazar's right to challenge [on appeal] his sentence and his status as a career offender," but found that the waiver, into which Salazar entered knowingly and voluntarily, precluded any collateral attack (Doc. 8, p. 5). The court, however, expressed concern that enforcing the waiver on collateral attack "would seriously undermine the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings." The court noted that Salazar had raised the career-offender issue repeatedly, and that he was "partially correct" in that Begay supports the argument that involuntary manslaughter is not a violent felony, an argument he raised in making his plea, at sentencing, and on direct appeal (Doc. 8, pp. 6-7). The court concluded that enforcing the waiver on collateral attack would "value form over substance and would result in a miscarriage of justice." Accordingly, the court determined that it would not enforce the plea waiver on collateral review as to the violent-felony predicate offense issue.

The court determined, however, that a petition for writ of audita querela was not the proper vehicle by which to attack his sentence. The court recognized that Salazar's Begay-based challenge was most like a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but found that Salazar was precluded from filing a second or successive 2255 petition because Begay did not state a new rule of constitutional law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). The court found that without the ability to file a second motion under § 2255, Salazar was left with no way to challenge his sentence. The court thus concluded that § 2255 was "inadequate or ineffective" to provide Salazar a remedy. Relying on Tenth Circuit precedent, the court determined that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was available to Salazar, and construed Salazar's petition for writ of audita querila as a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because of the well-established rule that section 2241 petitions must be brought in the district where the prisoner is confined, the court transferred the action to this district, where Salazar is now confined.

After the case was filed in this district, the government filed a status report, informing the Court that it would not file a response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus because the government's initial response to the petition for writ of audita querila in the District of Kansas was sufficient (Doc. 14).

II. DISCUSSION

Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Generally, applications for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be used to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing, but are limited to challenges regarding the execution of a sentence. See Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998). An inmate under sentence of a federal court may properly challenge his conviction and sentence by filing a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in the court which imposed the sentence. The statute limits an inmate to one challenge of his conviction and sentence under § 2255. An inmate may not file a "second or successive" motion unless a panel of the appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion contains either 1) newly discovered evidence "sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense," or 2) "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

For prisoners who are unable to meet the burden of bringing forth either newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court, section 2255 contains a "savings clause" which may allow for challenge of a conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. ยง 2241 if it "appears that the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.