The opinion of the court was delivered by: Amy J. St. Eve, District Court Judge:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On April 3, 2012, Plaintiff M.W. filed a nine-count Complaint against Defendants Cook County, the Cook County Sheriff's Office, individual Cook County Sheriff's Deputies, and the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center alleging constitutional violations and state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. In particular, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII with prejudice and grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I, II, III, and IX without prejudice. The Court also grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center as a Defendant to this lawsuit. Last, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint by no later than September 17, 2012 in compliance with this order.
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Under the federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put differently, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, [courts] view it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and making all possible inferences from the allegations in the plaintiff's favor." AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff may plead himself out of court by alleging facts showing that he has no legal claim. See Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, 676 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2012); Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011).
On or about February 15, 2008, police arrested Plaintiff, who was then a minor, after which they took him into custody and housed him at the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center. (R. 1, Compl. ¶ 10.) On May 6, 2008, the Cook County State's Attorney dropped the charges against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 11.) On May 20, 2008, the State's Attorney renewed charges against Plaintiff after which the Cook County Circuit Court judge directed that Plaintiff be detained at the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13.) After his court appearance, Plaintiff, along with certain Sheriff's Deputies, waited for the bus to the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center, but the bus never showed up. (Id. ¶ 14.) The Sheriff's Deputies proceeded to transfer Plaintiff with other detainees to the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDOC"), where they waited for the bus to transfer Plaintiff to the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center. (Id. ¶ 15.) When the Juvenile Detention Center bus did not show up, Defendant Officers processed Plaintiff into the general population of Division 11 of the CCDOC. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was in custody at the Cook County Jail for three days before his mother learned of his situation and was able to get proof of his age to the Cook County Sheriff's Office, at which time he was transferred to Division 9 of the CCDOC. (Id. ¶ 17.) Later that day, a Circuit Court judge ordered that Plaintiff be transferred to the Cook County Juvenile Detention facility. (Id. ¶ 17.) In the course of the three days that Plaintiff was detained in Division 11, he was subjected to various forms of mental, physical, and sexual abuse. (Id. ¶ 18.)
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) a Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim; (2) a substantive due process claim; and (3) a Monell claim. Plaintiff also alleges the following state law claims pursuant to the Court's supplemental jurisdiction: (1) negligent supervision; (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) negligent failure to act; and (4) respondeat superior.
I. Statute of Limitations
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff failed to file his constitutional claims within the relevant two-year statute of limitations. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2012) ("the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in Illinois is two years"). Defendants acknowledge that federal courts borrow state equitable and statutory tolling rules, including 720 ILCS 5/13-211, when using a state's limitations period. See Malone v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 553 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2009) ("when borrowing a state's period of limitations, the federal court must take all related doctrines, such as those that specify tolling, revival, and details of application"). Here, the relevant statutory tolling provision states in its entirety:
Minors and persons under legal disability. If the person entitled to bring an action, specified in Sections 13-201 through 13-210 of this Act, at the time the cause of action accrued, is under the age of 18 years, or is under a legal disability, then he or she may bring the action within 2 years after the person attains the age of 18 years, or the disability is removed. 720 ILCS 5/13-211; see also Softcheck v. Imesch, 367 Ill.App.3d 148, 154-55, 305 Ill.Dec. 425, 855 N.E.2d 941 (3d Dist. 2006) (minor must bring lawsuit within two years of turning 18 years of age).
Despite this statutory tolling provision, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff cannot bring the present action because -- based on his allegations that he was 16-years-old at the time of his arrest on February 18, 2008 -- he filed the present lawsuit after he turned 20-years-old. In response, Plaintiff explains that the allegations in the Complaint concerning his age are incorrect and that he was born on April 4, 1992. Therefore, he was not 20-years-old when he filed the present lawsuit on April 3, 2012, but was 19-years-old. Based on Plaintiff's representations, it appears that Plaintiff's constitutional claims are timely under 720 ILCS 5/13-211. Nevertheless, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice. Plaintiff must file an Amended Complaint including his actual date of birth in order to withstand another motion to dismiss based on timeliness issues.
II. Cook County Juvenile Detention Center as a Defendant
Next, Defendants argue that the Cook County Juvenile Detention Center is not a suable entity. The Court agrees. Federal courts look to state law when determining if a defendant is amenable to suit. See Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 215, 113 S.Ct. 716, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993); Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)). Under Illinois law, a "party to litigation must have a legal existence, either natural or artificial, to sue or be sued." Jackson v. Village of Rosemont, 180 Ill.App.3d 932, 937-38, 129 Ill.Dec. 670, 536 N.E.2d 720 (1st Dist. 1988); see also DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, 209 F.3d 973, 977 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). ...