The opinion of the court was delivered by: Amy J. St. Eve, District Court Judge:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Sloan's Fee Petition, which Sloan filed pursuant to the Court's April 12, 2012 and May 23, 2012 Orders. Sloan seeks $348,646.00 in attorney's fees and $12,547.45 in costs, for a grand total of $361,193.45. For the following reasons, the Court grants Sloan's Petition in part and denies it in part.
On April 12, 2012, the Court granted Sloan's motion to compel Zurn to produce certain documents and things, and further ordered Zurn to provide a Rule 30(b)(6) witness for a four-hour deposition to testify about Zurn's creation and testing of the Worn Zurn Flush Valves after Zurn's supplemental production. (R. 285.) Finding that Zurn had continually refused to produce relevant documents despite prior court intervention and a clear obligation to do so, the Court granted in part and denied in part Sloan's request for attorney's fees. Specifically, the Court ordered Zurn to pay "the costs of the renewed Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and the reasonable attorney's fees for one of Sloan's attorneys to attend the deposition," as well as "the reasonable attorney's fees associated with Sloan's preparation of the present motion to compel and reply in support of same." (Id. at 6-7.)
Additionally, the Court ordered Zurn to produce "all relevant, non-privileged documents and things in its possession regarding the Community Center Worn Valve contention, as well as a detailed privilege log." (Id. at 9.) Further, the Court stated that "[s]hould Sloan request it, Zurn must also produce a witness to testify about that contention during a deposition." (Id.) As a sanction for failing to comply with its discovery obligations, the Court ordered Zurn to "pay Sloan's reasonable attorney's fees and costs in connection with such additional discovery." (Id.)
On May 23, 2012, the Court granted in part and denied in part Sloan's renewed motion for sanctions. (R. 321.) Citing Zurn's "inadequate searches and less than forthcoming representations to the Court regarding the discovery it has undertaken in this case," the Court ordered Zurn to "pay the attorney's fees and costs for Sloan's renewed motion for sanctions and reply in support thereof, as well as Sloan's supplemental submission in response to Zurn's supplemental submission." (Id. at 31.) Additionally, the Court ordered Zurn to pay the attorney's fees and costs for Sloan's previous September 10, 2010 motion for sanctions. (Id.)
On August 3, 2012, Sloan filed its Petition for attorney's fees. On August 15, 2012, Zurn filed a written response. Sloan filed a written reply on August 23, 2012.*fn1
When determining whether attorney's fees are reasonable, the Court considers the lodestar method, namely, "multiplying 'the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation . . .by a reasonable hourly rate.'" Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Center, 664 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)); see also Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2009). The "lodestar figure is the 'starting point,'" and "[o]nce that figure is determined, the court may consider other factors set out in Hensley," which "include whether the documentation of the hours is adequate and whether 'billing judgment' was used." Enoch, 570 F.3d at 823.
The party seeking an award of attorney's fees has the burden of proving the "reasonableness of the hours worked and the hourly rates claimed." Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433); see also Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640. As the Seventh Circuit teaches, a "reasonable hourly rate" is "one that is 'derived from the market rate for the services rendered.'" Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640 (quoting Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2003)). Courts presume that an attorney's actual billing rate is an appropriate market rate. See Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,477 F.3d 899, 909 (7th Cir. 2007). Moreover, when a client pays the attorney's bill at a time when indemnification or reimbursement is uncertain, it is strong evidence of the reasonableness of the attorney's hourly rate. See, e.g., Kallman v. Radioshack Corp., 315 F.3d 731, 742 (7th Cir. 2002); Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 200 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1999) (reasonable fees are those "that commercial parties would have incurred and paid knowing that they had to cover the outlay themselves"). The court, however, has "an obligation to exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not reasonably expended on the litigation." Spegon, 175 F.3d at 550(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Stark v. PPM Am., Inc., 354 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2004) (courts should exclude from the fee petition "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" time spent).
Courts are mindful that a "request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation." Sottoriva v. Claps, 617 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). "In light of this concern, as well as the fact that determining what qualifies as a 'reasonable' use of a lawyer's time is a highly contextual and fact-specific enterprise," district courts have wide latitude when awarding attorney's fees. Id.
In support of its Petition, Sloan attaches the Declaration of Jason A. Berta, who is one of Sloan's outside attorneys from the law firm of Foley & Lardner LLP ("Foley"). (R. 357-1.) Attached to Mr. Berta's Declaration are redacted copies of invoices that Foley submitted to Sloan, setting ...