The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gilbert, District Judge:
Plaintiff Donald E. Karch, a pretrial detainee in the Jefferson County Jail, brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening.-- The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.-- On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint--
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts "should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds that expedited review of Plaintiff's claim is warranted.
In his pro se complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff alleges that the batteries in his pacemaker have gone dead, rendering it non-functional. The Defendants, Sheriff Roger Mulch and Nurse Cissy Brown, have refused to take him to a hospital to get the pacemaker or batteries replaced. Plaintiff is experiencing chest pain, as well as pain up and down his left arm, shoulder and neck. He cannot sleep for fear that he may not wake up again (Doc.1, p. 5).
Plaintiff seeks dismissal of the charges against him so that he may be released to seek medical care, and in the alternative, requests damages. Furthermore, on July 30, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a request (Doc. 7) in which he states his belief that his life is in danger and asked for an attorney to be appointed so he can get his pacemaker fixed. The Court shall construe this request as both a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and as a second request for the appointment of counsel.
Shortly before the instant complaint was filed, Plaintiff submitted another complaint, raising nearly identical claims against the same two Defendants. That complaint was filed on July 16, 2012, under Case No. 12-800-JPG.
Plaintiff states in the complaint filed in 12-800-JPG that jail staff is not sending his mail because he is suing them. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff did not intend to file two separate suits, but instead sent duplicate complaints out of a concern that his mail would not be delivered to the Court. The Seventh Circuit has indicated that related cases filed within the same U.S. District Court should be transferred to (or consolidated before) a single District Judge. See, e.g. Smith v. Check-N-go of Illinois, Inc., 200 F.3d 511, 513 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999); Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 1999). ...