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Edgar Perkins (#M-15408 v. Superintendent Daniel Moreci and Lieutenant Daniel Martinez

July 18, 2012

EDGAR PERKINS (#M-15408), PLAINTIFF,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT DANIEL MORECI AND LIEUTENANT DANIEL MARTINEZ, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Edgar Perkins ("Plaintiff" or "Perkins"), an inmate at the Western Illinois Correctional Center, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement while he was a pre-trial detainee at the Cook County Jail. Plaintiff names as Defendants Superintendent Daniel Moreci ("Moreci") and Lieutenant Daniel Martinez ("Martinez"), and alleges that from November 21, 2009, to March 1, 2010, he was in a cell that had a broken window, resulting in extremely cold temperatures. This matter is now before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 46]. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

At the time of the alleged violations, Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the Cook County Jail. Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in Division 9, tier 2B, cell 2301, at the Cook County Jail from November 21, 2009, to March 1, 2010. See Am. Compl. [Dkt. 28]. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the window in his cell was cracked and had small round holes in it (the size of the point of a Bic pen), resulting in extremely cold temperatures during the relevant time period, and that he was unable to obtain extra blankets or long underwear. Id.; see also DX B, Pl. Dep., at 28-30, 32.*fn1 Plaintiff alleges the cold air came through his cell window. Pl.'s Dep., at 33, 39. Plaintiff is suing Moreci and Martinez in their individual capacities.

Defendant Moreci was the Superintendent of Division 9 at all relevant time periods. Plaintiff states he spoke to Moreci two or three times about the heat issue. See id. at 18. Plaintiff believes he spoke to Lt. Martinez one time but does not remember when it was. Id. at 22-23. Martinez is named in Plaintiff's amended complaint because he is the supervisor who signed-off on Plaintiff's two requests regarding his complaint about the heat issue. Id. at 22-24. Plaintiff believes that Moreci and Martinez are liable to him because they were both supervisors assigned to Division 9. Id. at 24- 25.

Plaintiff was assigned to a bunk in his cell. He had sheet covers and a blanket, he wore his Cook County Jail uniform and underwear during the time period at issue. Id. at 40- 41. Plaintiff states he asked various non-party correctional personnel for extra blankets from November 2009, to March 2010, and that he never received an extra blanket. Id. at 41- 42.

Plaintiff submitted multiple grievances regarding the temperature in the cell-house during the relevant time period. See PX C. Plaintiff concedes he has no documentation or evidence that Moreci ever saw or received any grievance request made by him concerning his complaint of no heat. See Pl.'s Dep., at 43. However, the response by Martinez to Plaintiff's grievance dated January 6, 2010, indicates that Moreci was aware of an issue with the heat and had brought it to the attention of the facility manager. Id. at 44; see also PX C.

The affidavit of the Jim D'Amico ("D'Amico"), the facility manager, indicates that Cook County Jail personnel contact the facility manager when there are problems with systems at the jail, including heating, air conditioning, electrical, and plumbing. See DX F, D'Amico Aff., at ¶ 4. Pursuant to policy, facilities management engineers conduct daily rounds at the Cook County Jail to monitor temperature levels. Id. at ¶ 6. For purposes of the facilities management engineer's inspections, the acceptable temperature range is between sixty-eight and seventy-seven degrees. See DX F, Attach. 2 (Cook County Department of Facilities Management Policy Governing Monitoring Temperature Range at CCDOC). If during an inspection, the engineer determines that the temperature is outside of the acceptable range, the engineer makes every effort to bring the temperature within the acceptable range. Id. If acceptable temperature cannot be achieved and maintained, the engineer contacts administration so that further action can be taken, including inmate relocation. Id.

D'Amico reviewed the work order summary for the relevant time period and determined that no work orders were generated regarding problems with the heating system for Division 9, Tier 2B. See DX F, D'Amico Aff, at ¶ 7 and Attach. 1. If a complaint regarding the temperature were made, and the facilities management engineer determined that there was nothing wrong with the heating system, no work order would be generated or reflected on the Work Order Summary. Id. Plaintiff states that of the forty-eight detainees who were housed on his tier, he was the only one who wrote a complaint about insufficient heat. See Pl.'s Dep., at 50- 51.

Plaintiff states that as a result of being in his allegedly cold cell, he caught a cold and got sore feet from walking. See Am. Compl., at 5; Pl.'s Dep., at 73; and DX G. Plaintiff admits he never requested medical attention for his cold or sore feet/fingers. See Pl.'s Dep., at 73. Plaintiff's medical records for the time period at issue reveal that he never sought medical attention for a cold, cold related symptom, or sore feet. See DX E (affidavit of Dr. Avery Hart with Plaintiff's medical chart attached). Further, Plaintiff was seen and examined by Dr. David Carrington during the time period at issue and Plaintiff told Dr. Carrington that "he felt fine, his sleep was good." Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 988 (7th Cir. 2006). In determining whether factual issues exist, the Court must view all the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Weber v. Univs. Research Assoc., Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court does not "judge the credibility of the witnesses, evaluate the weight of the evidence, or determine the truth of the matter. The only question is whether there is a genuine issue of fact." Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).

However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Sarver v. Experian Info. Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). "A genuine issue of material fact arises only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists to permit a jury to return ...


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