Name of Assigned Judge Harry D. Leinenweber Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
For the reasons stated below, summary judgment as to the remaining amount due on the loan is denied. Status hearing set for 8/22/2012 at 9:00 a.m.
O[ For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.
Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in this mortgage foreclosure action. For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
Daniel Sledz signed a promissory note for a $1,680,555.49 loan from National City Bank ("National City") on September 1, 2008. This note and the subsequent repayment schedule was a continuation of a pre-existing balloon payment loan that had come due. Instead of making that balloon payment, Sledz arranged to restructure the debt payments under a new loan. Under the new loan, principle and interest payments were due on the first of every month, beginning October 1, 2008, until a new balloon payment came due on September 1, 2009. As security for the loan, Sledz pledged his home in Aurora, Illinois. (The pledge was technically made by Defendant Chicago Title Land Trust Company ("Chicago Title"), which succeeded Cole Taylor Bank as trustee of the land trust holding the property. Sledz is the beneficiary of this trust.) Sledz was unable to make the balloon payment when it came due and the bank, rather than foreclose, accepted interest-only payments. Eventually, Sledz stopped making even these payments and the bank filed for foreclosure.
The Court ruled on liability on May 11, 2012, granting summary judgment for Plaintiff PNC Bank, N.A. ("PNC"), the successor to National City. The Court continued the issue of how much remains due on the Note ("Note") until Defendants had an opportunity to file a sur-reply to a supplemental affidavit Plaintiff filed in its reply.
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden of showing the needlessness of trial is on the movant, but the Court must consider all reasonable inference in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pouls v. Vill. Of Pleasant Prairie, 10-C-394, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37412, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2012) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. V. Zenith Radio Corp., Ltd., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, where the non-movant is the party with the ultimate burden of proof at trial, that party retains its burden of producing evidence that would support a reasonable jury verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
In their response to summary judgment, the Defendants take issue with the Plaintiff's calculation of the amount due remaining under the Note. The Plaintiff contends that the amounts due and owing on the Note, as of July 15, 2011, are as follows: $1,568,518.45 (principal), $71,073.49 (interest), and $88,592.79 (late charges), for a total owed of $1,728,184.73.
The Defendants disagree with Plaintiff's calculation of the amount due on the promissory note, arguing that in September 2009 a series of payments were incorrectly applied to the debt at issue in this Note. Specifically, the Defendanst contend that on September 25, 2008 three payments were entered on the Note of $15,661.85 ("First Payment"), $14,004.63 ("Second ...