The opinion of the court was delivered by: Charles P. Kocoras, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Beissbarth GmbH's ("Beissbarth") and Robert Bosch, GmbH's ("Bosch Germany") (collectively, the "German Defendants") motions to dismiss Plaintiff Snap-on Inc.'s ("Snap-on") complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated herein, the German Defendants' motions are denied.
On November 3, 2009, Snap-on filed a complaint against Robert Bosch, LLC ("Bosch USA") alleging that Bosch USA infringed on several of its patents relating to a wheel aligner used to service automobiles. On August 18, 2011, Snap-on filed an amended complaint, in which it added Bosch Germany and Beissbarth as defendants. Both Bosch Germany and Beissbarth are corporations organized under the laws of Germany. Beissbarth and Bosch USA are subsidiaries of Bosch Germany, and the presidents of these two subsidiaries hold high-level management positions at Bosch Germany. Additionally, the companies share physical assets and intellectual property. The German Defendants distribute their products for sale in North America through Bosch USA.
For purposes of the Defendants' Motions, we must accept all well-pleaded facts as true. Snap-o alleges that the German Defendants worked together with Bosch USA "in a coordinated effort to bring [the infringing aligner] to the United States market." Bosch Germany directed the activity that resulted in the sale of the infringing wheel aligner in the United States. To facilitate the introduction of the infringing aligner in the United States, Bosch Germany acquired Beissbarth, a company experienced in the manufacture of diagnostics equipment such as wheel aligners. The German Defendants and Bosch USA (collectively, "Defendants") then allegedly engaged in a joint enterprise to sell the infringing aligner in the United States. The Defendants collectively participated in sales of the wheel aligner, held several meetings in Illinois related to the sale of the infringing aligner, conducted testing on the wheel aligner in Illinois, and trained technicians on the proper maintenance and operation of the wheel aligner in Illinois.
On January 16, 2012, the German Defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). The Court allowed limited discovery into the jurisdictional issue, which is still ongoing. Meanwhile, on May 4, 2012, the German Defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss Snap-on's complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is used to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. To state a claim, the allegations in the complaint must set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While detailed factual allegations are not required, a plaintiff must provide enough factual support to raise her right to relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice;" rather, a claim must provide sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court accepts all well-pleaded facts and allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 771 (7th Cir. 2009). DISCUSSION
Snap-on contends that the German Defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are procedurally improper because they previously filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) provides that "a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion." Although the German Defendants filed their current motions to dismiss after filing their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, refusing to consider the merits of the instant motions would run afoul of the underlying purpose of Rule 12(g). The consolidation requirements of Rule 12(g) are designed to prevent piecemeal litigation, which delay the judicial process. See Ennenga v. Starns, 677 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2012). In this case, the adjudication of the German Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions would promote judicial efficiency by advancing the litigation. The Court had previously allowed limited discovery to resolve the parties' jurisdictional dispute raised in the German Entities' Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and that discovery is highly contested and still ongoing. If the German Defendants are successful on their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it would obviate the need for the ongoing jurisdictional discovery.
The German Defendants, having sought prior leave of the Court to file their Rule 12(b)(6) motions, represented that the motions were filed, in part, to avoid the time, expenses, and resources involved in resolving their jurisdictional dispute. There is no dilatory motive in the German Defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the motions promote rather than hinder the policy underlying Rule 12(g). See Donelli v. Peters Secs. Co., No. 02 C 0691, 2002 WL 2003217, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2002) (allowing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss that was filed after a fully adjudicated Rule 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss because the motion was "not filed for the purpose of delay" and the "adjudication of the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion would narrow the scope of the matter, greatly expediting resolution of the case"). Accordingly, the German Defendants' motions are not contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and we will therefore consider the substance of the motions over Snap-on's objections.
A patent holder may sustain a cause of action for direct infringement against anyone who "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The German Defendants maintain that Snap-on has failed to allege that any infringing activity attributable to them took place in the United States.
"It is well established that the reach of Section 271(a) is limited to infringing activities that occur within the United States." MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Snap-on contends that the amended complaint states a claim for direct infringement because it alleges that the German Defendants: (1) sold or offered to ...