The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Henry Bros. Construction Management Services, LLC's motion to dismiss Count II of Plaintiff Hartford Fire Insurance Company's complaint . For the following reasons, Defendant's motion  is granted.
The instant dispute arises out of a construction project at the Glenbrook South High School in Glenview, Illinois. The school project is owned by the Northfield Township High School District #225 (the "District"). Defendant Henry Bros. Construction Management Services, LLC ("HBC") performed construction management services on the project pursuant to a contract with the District. See Ex. A to Cmplt. (hereinafter the contract or the "CM Contract"). The only parties to the contract were the District and HBC.
Among other things, the CM Contract established certain of HBC's duties and obligations during the project. ¶ 12. One of the duties that the contract imposed on HBC was to develop and implement procedures for reviewing and processing payment applications submitted by the various contractors and subcontractors. ¶ 14. In connection with this responsibility, HBC had an "affirmative obligation to investigate the work performed by the contractors on the Project and make certifications to [the District] that the contractor requesting payment is entitled to payment in the amount certified under the contract documents." ¶ 15. Certifying payment meant that HBC was certifying to the District that (1) the work in question had progressed to the point indicated in the payment request; (2) the quality of work was acceptable and in accordance with the contract documents; and (3) the contractor requesting payment was entitled to payment under the applicable contract documents. ¶ 16. The contract also required HBC to gather lien waivers and sworn statements listing subcontractors and materialmen before issuing payment certificates. ¶ 17. After receiving HBC's certification, the District would pay the approved amounts to the contractors.
Grace Electrical Construction Corporation ("Grace") is a contractor that performed electrical work on the project under HBC's supervision. Grace, too, contracted directly with the District. See Ex. B to Cmplt. (the "Grace Contract"). The only parties to the Grace Contract were the District and Grace. Illinois law required Grace to provide a performance and payment surety bond to secure its performance of the Grace Contract and its payment of certain subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen. On May 29, 2007, Plaintiff Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford") issued a bond on behalf of Grace for the project. See Ex. C to Cmplt. In exchange for the bond, Hartford required Grace to execute a general indemnity agreement.
During the course of performance of the Grace Contract, Grace submitted three payment applications to HBC. Hartford alleges that HBC certified work included in these payment applications which Grace either did not perform, performed defectively, and/or performed in an untimely manner. ¶ 39. In reliance on HBC's certification of the payment applications, the District paid Grace a total of $731,880. ¶ 40. On or about December 4, 2007, due to a financial hardship, Grace ceased work on the project and sent the District a letter terminating its rights under the Grace Contract. Grace had not achieved substantial completion of the Grace Contract at that time. Further, Grace had failed to pay numerous of its project vendors and had failed to provide the required lien waivers pursuant to the contract. ¶¶ 45-46.
Following Grace's default, the District asserted a claim against the performance bond. In order to discharge is obligations under the bond, Hartford agreed to take over and complete Grace's performance of the Grace Contract. ¶¶ 50-51. Hartford paid $447,662.21 to numerous vendors of Grace that furnished labor and material to the project but never received payment from Grace. Hartford also ultimately paid $742,480.29 in costs to remedy the work of Grace to complete the project. In total, Hartford alleges that it has incurred a net loss of $833,104.21. ¶ 80. Hartford alleges that after it "paid the claimants and completed the [Grace] Contract as required by the Bonds, by operation of law, [Hartford] subrogated to the rights of Grace's project vendors, Grace and [the District]." ¶ 69. Hartford further alleges that "[b]ecause of [HBC's] mismanagement and other deficiencies, the project vendors and [the District] are entitled to assert a cause of action against [HBC] for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation." ¶ 70. Hartford now "brings the instant action as subrogee against [HBC]."
Count I alleges that HBC breached the CM Contract by, inter alia, failing to properly investigate, supervise, and administer Grace's work on the project. ¶¶ 72-80. In particular, Hartford alleges that the District overpaid Grace in reliance on HBC's certifications. Count II is a claim for negligent misrepresentation relating to HBC's approvals of Grace's payment applications. Hartford alleges that "[w]hile performing its professional construction administration services, HBC negligently supplied incomplete, inaccurate, misleading, and false information to SD225 concerning Grace's performance of the Prime Contract." Hartford claims that it suffered losses as a result of the unavailability of sufficient contract funds to "correct, repair or complete Grace's work." Hartford makes no claim for personal injury or damage to other property.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the case. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint first must comply with Rule 8(a) by providing "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" (Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)), such that the defendant is given "fair notice of the way the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed 2d 80 (1957)). Second, the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to raise the possibility of relief above the "speculative level," assuming that all of the allegations in the complaint are true. E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. The Court accepts as true all of the well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2005).
In order to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation under Illinois law, a party must allege (1) a false statement of material fact; (2) carelessness or negligence in ascertaining the truth of the statement by the party making it; (3) an intention to induce the other party to act; (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the statement; (5) damage to the other party resulting from such reliance; and (6) a duty on the party making the statement to communicate accurate information. See Tricontinental Industries, Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 833--34 (7th Cir. 2007). The tort of negligent misrepresentation essentially has the same elements as fraudulent misrepresentation, except that the defendant's mental state is different.*fn2 The defendant need not know that the statement is false; rather, "[h]is own carelessness or negligence in ascertaining the truth will suffice for a cause of action. Doe v. Dilling, 228 Ill.2d 324, 360 (2008) (citing Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago v. A,C & S, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 428, 452 (1989)).
Suits for purely economic damages based on negligent
misrepresentations generally are
barred in Illinois under the so-called Moorman doctrine. See Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443
(1982).*fn3 However, the Illinois Supreme Court has
imposed a duty on a party to avoid negligently conveying false
information if the party is in the business of
supplying information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions. See First Midwest Bank, N.A. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co.,
843 N.E.2d 327 (2006) (citing Brogan v. Mitchell International, Inc.,
692 N.E.2d 276 (1998); Moorman, 435 N.E.2d 443). Thus, in order to
prevail on a negligent misrepresentation claim in this case, Hartford
must establish that HBC was in the business of supplying information
for the guidance of others in business transactions.*fn4
In order to determine that a defendant is in the business of
supplying information, (i) the defendant must supply the information
in the course of his or her business and (ii) the information must be
supplied for the guidance of ...