Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge Amy J. St. Eve than Assigned Judge
Plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees  is granted in the amount of $45,396.88.
O[ For further details see text below.] Notices mailed by Judicial staff.
Before the Court is Plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). For the following reasons, the Court grants the petition in the amount of $45,396.88.
On May 18, 2010, Plaintiff Kevin LaSalvia, through his attorney Basileios Foutris, filed this action against Defendant Police Officers Thomas Giese and Joseph Panek, and Police Sergeant Ryan Glew, alleging violations of his constitutional rights.*fn1 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case proceeded to trial, at which Mr. Fourtris and another attorney, Scott Dolezel, represented Plaintiff. On January 5, 2012, following a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on his excessive force claim against Defendant Giese and awarded $2,300 in compensatory damages. The jury returned verdicts for the defense on each of the remaining claims: failure to intervene against Defendant Panek, and failure to provide medical care against Defendants Giese, Panek, and Glew. (R. 83, 88.) The Court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. (Id.) On March 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed the present petition for attorney's fees. (R. 100.)
The prevailing party in a § 1983 action may recover reasonable attorney's fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. To determine a reasonable fee, the Seventh Circuit instructs district courts to use the lodestar method, namely to multiply the "number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate." Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Cent., 664 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hensley, v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 40 (1983)). This method "applies even in cases where the attorney represents the prevailing party pursuant to a contingent fee agreement." Pickett, 664 F.3d at 639. After arriving at the lodestar figure, "other considerations . . . may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the 'results obtained.'" Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. If a "plaintiff prevails on only some of his interrelated claims, . . . . the 'district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.'" Sottoriva v. Claps, 617 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37); see also DeCola v. Keel, No. 09 C 3799, 2010 WL 5232972, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2010) (reducing lodestar by 50% "based on counsel's limited success").
Here, Plaintiff seeks $128,437.50 in attorney's fees as a prevailing party under § 1988(b). (R. 100, Pl.'s Pet. at 15.) Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff's status as a prevailing party, but argues that $17,700 in attorney's fees would better reflect the results of the trial.*fn2 (R. 102, Def.'s Resp. at 1.) In approaching Plaintiff's fee petition, the Court first calculates the lodestar amount, with reference to Defendant's specific objections, and then determines whether that figure is appropriate given the circumstances of this case. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2012).