Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

In Re Northfield Laboratories

June 26, 2012

IN RE NORTHFIELD LABORATORIES, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge George M. Marovich

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Lead plaintiffs, the Paul H. Shield, M.D. Inc. Money Purchase Plan and the Paul H. Shield, M.D. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, and defendants Northfield Laboratories, Inc. ("Northfield"), Steven A. Gould, M.D. ("Gould") and Richard E. DeWoskin ("DeWoskin"), collectively the "parties," have reached an agreement to settle plaintiffs' claims that defendants violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. The Court held a fairness hearing hearing on the matter of the settlement on June 26, 2012. The Court now grants final approval of the settlement agreement. Also before the Court is class counsel's motion for reimbursement of attorneys' fees and expenses from the settlement fund.

I. Background

Defendant Northfield was founded in 1985 by defendants DeWoskin and Gould. Northfield's primary purpose was to research and develop a hemoglobin-based blood substitute called PolyHeme to treat life-threatening blood loss. PolyHeme was a hemoglobin-based, oxygen-carrying blood substitute that was compatible with all blood types. Northfield manufactured PolyHeme by extracting hemoglobin molecules from outdated human blood, chemically modifying the hemoglobin into a polymerized form of hemoglobin and incorporating the polymerized hemoglobin into a solution, which could then be administered to humans. Northfield was never able to bring PolyHeme to market, and the company filed a petition for bankruptcy protection on June 1, 2009.

The Court previously concluded that plaintiffs had stated a claim against defendants for securities fraud. First, plaintiffs alleged that after Northfield had closed a clinical trial due to allegedly negative results, defendants stated, on August 3, 2001, that they intended to close the trial. Second, plaintiffs alleged that defendants, in Northfield's August 9, 2002 10-K filing (and in its 2003 and 2004 10-K filings), misstated the reason why the clinical study was stopped. Third, plaintiffs alleged that on October 11, 2001, Gould made a misstatement when he stated "no evidence of blood vessel constriction, or renal, pancreatic, gastrointestinal or cardiac dysfunction" were observed in a clinical trial even though cardiac dysfunction was observed. Fourth, plaintiffs alleged that a September 4, 2001 press release contained misstatements about clinical trial results. Fifth, plaintiffs alleged that defendants included misstatements in an August 3, 2001 proxy statement when they said "none of the adverse effects historically associated with other hemoglobin solutions have been identified by our clinical studies" when, in fact, plaintiffs alleged, cardiac events were not only present but historically associated with hemoglobin solutions.

The first time plaintiffs moved for class certification, the Court denied the motion. Lead plaintiffs had proposed a class of all persons who had purchased Northfield's shares between (and including) March 19, 2001 and March 20, 2006. The problem with that class definition was that plaintiffs were unable to put forth evidence that Northfield shares traded in an efficient market for the early years of the class period. The upshot was that the plaintiffs could not avail themselves of the fraud-on-the-market theory and would, instead, have to prove reliance individually. That meant that individual issues would predominate and that the case was not suitable for class treatment.

The lead plaintiffs then moved to certify a smaller class, one made up of persons who purchased Northfield shares between (and including) August 16, 2004 and March 20, 2006. After plaintiffs filed their second motion for class certification, the parties began discussing settlement and asked the Court to stay briefing on that motion (which plaintiffs ultimately withdrew). Over the course of several months, the parties continued to discuss settlement. With the help of a retired federal judge as mediator, the parties reached a settlement agreement.

As part of the proposed settlement, the parties asked the Court to certify a class of persons who purchased shares of Northfield between (and including) August 16, 2004 and March 20, 2006. The Court granted the motion for class certification.

As part of the settlement, defendants agreed to put $1,500,000.00 into a settlement fund for the plaintiff class. The money came from the insurance policy that has been funding the defense of this lawsuit. Additional money from Northfield is not available. The parties agree that it is very unlikely that enough assets remain to allow these plaintiffs to obtain any money from the bankruptcy estate. This is not a surprise considering that Northfield never sold a single product and that all of its cash flow came from investors. Of the $1,500,000.00, the parties allocated $100,000.00 for the expenses related to notifying the class members and administering the claims process. The parties also agreed that the two lead plaintiffs will receive a combined total $10,000.00. The Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement.

The Court also approved a notice procedure for the class, and that notice has been given. The parties printed a summary notice in Investors' Business Daily on March 1, 2012 and also published it electronically on the GlobeNewswire on February 28, 2012. The claims administrator mailed 21,927 copies of the Notice and Proof of Claim. The Court set a deadline for plaintiffs' attorneys to file their request for fees and expenses that was more than a month before the deadlines for (1) opting out of the class, (2) filing a proof of claim, and (3) objecting to the settlement. Ultimately, the claims administrator received 2,061 claims. Not one person objected to the settlement. One person opted out of the settlement.

II. Discussion

A. Final approval of settlement

Once a class is certified, the class claims may not be settled without the approval of the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) ("The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the court's approval"). A court may approve a settlement "only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(2). In considering whether a class action settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable, a court "must consider 'the strength of plaintiffs' case compared to the amount of defendants' settlement offer, an assessment of the likely complexity, length and expense of the litigation, an evaluation of the amount of opposition to the settlement among affected parties, the opinion of competent counsel, and the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement.'" Synfuel Technologies, Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1996)). The most important factor is the strength of the plaintiff's case. Id.

The only factor the Court did not consider when it granted preliminary approval of the settlement was the opposition to the settlement among affected parties. Now that the class members have been notified of the settlement and have had a chance to object, it is clear that there is no opposition to the settlement among the affected parties. It appears that the class members agree with the Court's and ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.