The opinion of the court was delivered by: Milton I. ShadurSenior United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Issuance of this memorandum opinion and order follows a number of stillbirths. Each successive filing in the steady flow generated by pro se plaintiff Kirsha Brown-Younger ("Brown-Younger") has posed some type of problem that stimulates the need to provide a judicial response or ruling -- most often critical in nature. But the conversion of this Court's dictation via Dictaphone into its final form after transcription by its secretary, followed by its own final editing, has been dramatically slowed by the current unavailability of its permanent secretary coupled with the extremely limited availability of temporary secretarial service. As a result, the several false starts have had to be merged into this opinion in an episodic fashion.
No effort has been made here to list the matters in some order of importance or to follow the chronology of Brown-Younger's submissions. But the end result of her serious abuse of the litigation process has been to cast more than a serious doubt as to her entitlement to proceed with this lawsuit. This opinion is issued sua sponte to explain why.
That said, it is logical to begin with the posture of the case vis-a-vis Lulu Press, Inc. ("Lulu", which Brown-Younger mistakenly lists in her Complaint as Lulu.com) -- not just because Lulu is Brown-Younger's first-named defendant but also because her self-publication of her book of poetry through Lulu marks the origin of the claimed copyright infringements charged in this litigation. On June 14 Brown-Younger filed a motion for entry of a default against Lulu. But what she does not acknowledge (but the court record expressly reflects) is that her then-appointed counsel had agreed to, and this Court had accordingly ordered on May 30, a brief further extension (until June 15) for Lulu to plead to the Complaint -- an entirely reasonable matter of professional courtesy, although not perhaps to a litigant as combatant as Brown-Younger. Thus Lulu has in fact filed a timely response (of which more is said later) on June 15, so that the motion for default is denied.
At least as importantly, Lulu's June 15 response -- a motion for dismissal or stay -- includes as an exhibit the document pursuant to which Brown-Younger's self-publication of her work took place -- and that document, a comprehensive Membership Agreement required of every new registrant with Lulu, includes an express agreement (part of its paragraph 16) to resolve any dispute that cannot be settled in good faith negotiation through arbitration rather than litigation, and to do so in North Carolina to boot. All that Brown-Younger says to that, in a mixed-bag June 18 filing,*fn1 is this:
She claims that she does not recall reviewing nor signing a contractual agreement with Lulu.com. She also claims that she believes that this Contract was not available for review 5-6 yrs ago when she signed up for an account with lulu.com.
She claims that she is sure that at the time, 5-6 yrs ago, Lulu.com website had stated "that there is no contract, and we do not market, distribute or sell your book for you, and Authors have to self-market their own book."
From that combination of a lack of recollection together with her wholly unsupported claims, she springboards into charging Lulu with having concocted a fraudulent exhibit ("a contract such as the one that Lulu fraudulently drafted, in order to defend themselves in this suit").
There is no reason to credit Brown-Younger's purported reply -- to the contrary, the very nature of Lulu's existence is totally consistent with the kind of contractual restrictions that its exhibit portrays, applicable to everyone that makes use of its services (and not just Brown-Younger).
And that is only one nail in the coffin into which Brown-Younger appears to have buried her claim to credibility. For example, in that same June 18 filing she asks that "the proceedings should be stayed pending the results of the FBI investigation into copy right infringement, because she claims that she had filed a complaint with the Bureau."
That type of lashing out appears to typify Brown-Younger's reaction to anyone whom, or to anything that, she regards as having interfered with her self-defined goals. Thus she had earlier filed a motion for sanctions against her former counsel,*fn2 to which he has now filed his response. That response refutes her accusatory charges chapter and verse, reporting among other things that:
1. Lulu had telephoned him to say that just four of Brown-Younger's books had been sold (two to Brown-Younger herself) and that it had tried to communicate with Brown-Younger to send the royalties -- but Brown-Younger had let her account lapse or go dormant and did not respond to e-mails.
2. Co-defendant Amazon had sent him copies of several letters that it had addressed to Brown-Younger, stating that it had never sold any copies of her book and demanding its dismissal from the action, failing which it was prepared to seek sanctions against her (including sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 11).
3. Perhaps most significantly in light of what is presently under discussion, Brown-Younger filed charges against her appointed counsel before the ARDC a week before the two ...