Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County. No. 08-MR-213 Honorable Thomas A. Meyer, Judge, Presiding.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice McLAREN
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Jorgensen and Justice Hudson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
¶ 1 Plaintiffs, 1940 LLC and Arthur P. Schueler, Jr., appeal from the orders of the trial court denying their motion for partial summary judgment and entering judgment, after a trial, in favor of defendants, the County of McHenry and the McHenry County Board. We affirm.
¶ 3 In March 2008, plaintiffs filed a petition with the county pursuant to section 5-12014(b) of the Illinois Counties Code (Code) (55 ILCS 5/5-12014(b) (West 2008)), seeking a zoning reclassification for property located in unincorporated McHenry County. The McHenry County Zoning Board of Appeals voted to approve the petition for reclassification. On July 15, 2008, the McHenry County Board (Board) voted 11 to 10 in favor of the petition. However, Kenneth Koehler, the Board chairman, ruled that the petition needed "a majority of the County Board, not a majority of the County Board present," to pass. As the Board consisted of 24 elected members, the petition failed "because it did not get a majority of the County Board."
¶ 4 Plaintiffs then filed a six-count complaint in the circuit court of McHenry County. After four counts were dismissed, plaintiffs proceeded on counts seeking: (count II) de novo judicial review pursuant to section 5-12012.1 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-12012.1 (West 2008)); and (count III) declaratory judgment. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on count III and later, after a trial on an agreed record and briefs, entered judgment in favor of defendants on both counts. This appeal followed.
¶ 6 Plaintiffs appeal from "the trial court's findings and holdings as they relate to the court's interpretation and application of Section 5-12014(b) of the Illinois Counties Code." Because the interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law, our review is de novo. See Terraces of Sunset Park, LLC v. Chamberlin, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1095 (2010). The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature; to determine that intent, we look first to the statute's language. Id. Clear statutory language must be applied as written without resort to aids or tools of interpretation. Id. Ordinary rules of statutory construction mandate that a court will not read into a statute any conditions, exceptions, or limitations not appearing in its plain language. Onwentsia Club v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2011 IL App (2d) 100388,
¶ 20. Words and phrases should not be considered in isolation but should be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions and the statute as a whole. County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill. 2d 593, 604 (2008). We will construe a statute as a whole so that no part is rendered meaningless or superfluous. People v. McClure, 218 Ill. 2d 375, 382 (2006). Where a statute is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, it will be deemed ambiguous, and we then can consider extrinsic aids to construction, such as legislative history. County of Du Page, 231 Ill. 2d at 604.
¶ 7 Section 5-12014 of the Code provides in relevant part:
"Amendment of regulations and districts. (a) For purposes of this Section, the term 'text amendment' means an amendment to the text of a zoning ordinance, which affects the whole county, and the term 'map amendment' means an amendment to the map of a zoning ordinance, which affects an individual parcel or parcels of land.
(b) The regulations imposed and the districts created under the authority of this Division may be amended from time to time by ordinance or resolution, after the ordinance or resolution establishing same has gone into effect, but no such amendments shall be made without a hearing before the board of appeals. *** Except as provided in subsection (c), text amendments may be passed at a county board meeting by a simple majority of the elected county board members, unless written protests against the proposed text amendment are signed by 5% of the land owners of the county, in which case such amendment shall not be passed except by the favorable vote of 3/4 of all the members of the county board. Except as provided in subsection (c), map amendments may be passed at a county board meeting by a simple majority of the elected county board members, except that in [certain] case[s] of written protest against any proposed map amendment ***, such amendment shall not be passed except by the favorable vote of 3/4 of all the members of the county board, but in counties in which the county board consists of 3 members only a 2/3 vote is required. *** Notwithstanding any other provision ...