The opinion of the court was delivered by: Joe Billy McDADE United States Senior District Judge
Tuesday, 15 May, 2012 10:05:13 AM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 9). Plaintiff has responded in opposition to the Motion, and it is now ready for disposition. (Docs. 11 & 12). Defendant has also filed a Motion for leave to file a Reply brief, which the Court denies; no Reply is necessary for the Court to properly interpret the parties' arguments. (Doc. 13). For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part.
"In ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party." In re marchFIRST Inc., 589 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.2008)). To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's complaint must "plead some facts that suggest a right to relief that is beyond the 'speculative level.'" EEOC v. Concentra Health Svcs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776-77 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560-63 (2007)). Though detailed factual allegations are not needed, a "formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547. "The complaint must contain 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Bissessur v. Indiana University Bd. of Trustees, 581 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084).
On the other hand, "complaints need not anticipate and attempt to plead around defenses." U.S. v. Northern Trust Co., 372 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980); United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 350 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2003)). Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds should only be granted where the "plaintiff pleads himself out of court by alleging facts sufficient to establish the complaint's tardiness." Cancer Foundation, Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Management, LP, 559 F.3d 671, 674-75 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 691 fn. 1 (7th Cir. 2006) ("a federal complaint does not fail to state a claim simply because it omits facts that would defeat a statute of limitations defense")).
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that he, a Pekin Police officer, was removed from duty by Defendant Gillespie on March 23, 2006, and returned him to work September 15, 2008. Plaintiff lost wages and benefits while off-duty during this period.
On March 23, 2007, Defendant Gillespie proffered charges of misconduct relating to incidents in 2006 and 2007 against Plaintiff to the Defendant Pekin Police and Fire Commission, and seeking his termination. The Defendant Commission held a hearing on these charges between July 18 and 25, 2007. On November 21, 2007, the Defendant Commission issued its decision. Defendants Wallinger, Franks, and Short, acting as Commissioners for the Defendant Commission, imposed a 20-day suspension on Plaintiff, apparently as a result of these charges, but did not decide the issue of Plaintiff's mental fitness to return to work, and so Plaintiff could not return to work. Plaintiff appealed the Commission's decision, and the Illinois Appellate Court ruled in Plaintiff's favor on October 13, 2009, vacating the 20-day suspension.
On October 2, 2007, Defendant Gillespie ordered Plaintiff to undergo a psychological evaluation. Defendant Gillespie proffered a second set of charges against Plaintiff to the Defendant Commission on October 19, 2007, again alleging misconduct and seeking Plaintiff's termination. The Defendant Commission found in Plaintiff's favor on the second set of charges on February 6, 2008; this decision was affirmed on administrative review, and Defendant Gillespie did not appeal to the Appellate Court. On February 6, 2008, the Defendant Commission declined to allow Plaintiff to return to work. Defendant Gillespie rescinded his order of suspension on September 15, 2008, and allowed Plaintiff to return to work.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that, between March 24, 2006 and
September 15, 2008, Defendants denied him his protected liberty and
property interests in his employment without due process of law in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that they conspired to so deprive
him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. In addition, because Illinois
law states that if charges against a police officer are not sustained
the officer is to be reimbursed for all wages withheld,*fn1
and because Plaintiff alleges that he has never been
reimbursed for the wages, Plaintiff appears to claim, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, an unconstitutional deprivation of his protected
property interest in reimbursement. He also appears to claim that
Defendants conspired to commit this violation of Plaintiff's right to
reimbursement in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Finally, Plaintiff
appears to raise contractual and personal injury claims relating to
his suspension from duty.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed on two grounds: it is barred by the statute of limitations, and it otherwise fails to state ...