The opinion of the court was delivered by: Reagan, District Judge:
Carl R. Raymond ("Plaintiff" or "Raymond") brings this action for deprivation of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the time he filed his complaint in this Court, Raymond was an inmate confined in the Pinckneyville Correctional Center. He later notified this Court that he had been discharged from custody and placed on mandatory supervised release. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening.-- The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.-- On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint--
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations are sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts "should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Id. At the same time, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the complaint and supporting exhibits, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A and dismiss this case.
B. Summary of Complaint Allegations
Raymond was sentenced on September 24, 2010, to eighteen months in Edwards County Case No. 10-CF-29, for defrauding a drug screening test (Doc. 1-1, pp. 8-10). On October 12, 2010, Raymond was given a three-year sentence in Wabash County Case No. 05-CF-17 (Count I), for possession of methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals (Doc. 1, p. 5; Doc. 1-1, pp. 2-4). This three-year sentence was ordered to run concurrently with both the eighteen-month sentence in Edwards County No. 10-CF-29 and a previous five-year sentence imposed on Count II in Wabash County No. 05-CF-17 (Doc. 1-1, p. 4; Doc. 1, p. 5).
However, upon entering the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"), Plaintiff learned that IDOC had not calculated his sentences to run concurrently as ordered and that they had projected his release date to be December 3, 2011 (Doc. 1, p. 5). Had the sentences been properly calculated, his release date should have been June 15, 2011. Id. Plaintiff claims he suffered mental distress and insomnia after being informed he would have to serve an additional six months beyond his expected sentence.
In January 2011, Plaintiff filed a state habeas corpus action in Wabash County Circuit Court, seeking to correct the sentence computation. That case was dismissed (Doc. 1-2, pp. 3-11). On April 13, 2011, he filed a habeas action in the Illinois Supreme Court (Doc. 1-2, p. 15). That matter was still pending at the time ...