The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sue E. Myerscough, U.S. District Judge:
Monday, 16 April, 2012 03:37:44 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
On December 2, 2011 the Court entered an order defining the claims in this case and concluding that those claims were improperly joined in one action. Plaintiff was directed to inform the Court which claim he wished to pursue in this case. He was also directed to file a motion to sever if he wished to proceed with the unrelated claim by opening another case and posting an additional bond of $100.
Plaintiff responded by filing an objection, which the Court construes as a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Kerr retaliated against him by filing a disciplinary ticket against Plaintiff because Defendant Kerr was unsatisfied with the discipline Plaintiff had already received for the incident. This does not state a retaliation claim because the basis for the retaliation was Plaintiff's perceived lenient punishment, not the exercise of any First Amendment right by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff seems to assert in his objections that he does not intend to pursue a claim against Kerr for Kerr's refusal to allow Plaintiff to use the restroom. Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed along with Defendant Kerr, and no additional bond will be imposed.
Plaintiff also objects to the dismissal of the other Defendants. As the Court explained, administrators are not liable for their subordinates' constitutional violations solely because those administrators are in charge. See Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)(no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Additionally, an individual is not personally responsible for a constitutional violation caused by someone else solely because that individual rules against a plaintiff in grievances about the incident. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.").
Plaintiff asserts in his objections that his conditions in segregation on two occasions involved 30-day deprivations of hygiene necessities, a mattress, cover, and clothing. The Court has already determined that this states a potential claim against Defendants McAdory, Williams, and Parson. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Hankins, Proctor, Jumper, and Caraway knew that Plaintiff was without any of his "property" while in segregation. Plaintiff may be asserting that Defendants Hankins, Proctor, Jumper, and Caraway knew that Plaintiff was without clothing, a mattress, and hygiene necessities for 30 days and had the authority to do something about it. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion will be granted to the extent he seeks to reinstate these four Defendants.
1) Plaintiff's objection to the Court's December, 2011 order is construed as a motion to reconsider (d/e 12). The motion is granted in part and denied in part (d/e 12). The motion is granted to the extent Plaintiff seeks leave to reinstate Defendants Hankins, Proctor, Jumper, and Caraway. The clerk is directed to reinstate said Defendants. The motion is otherwise denied.
2) Plaintiff's motion to show cause is denied (d/e 15).
3) Defendant Kerr is dismissed without prejudice. The claim regarding Kerr's alleged refusal to allow Plaintiff to use the restroom is dismissed without prejudice.
4) The Clerk is directed to attempt service of the Complaint and this order on each Defendant pursuant to this District's internal procedures for Rushville cases.
5) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a Waiver of Service to the Clerk within 30 days after the Waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of ...