The opinion of the court was delivered by: Amy J. St. Eve, District Court Judge:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Bret Broaddus' Motion to Strike Lake Forest Bank's Response and Vacate Two Orders of January 5, 2011. For the following reasons, the Court denies Broaddus' motion.
Broaddus asks the Court to vacate its January 5, 2012 Memorandum Opinion and Order as well as the Stipulation and Order that the Court entered on January 5, 2012 (the "Stipulation and Order"). (R. 327, 329.) The January 5 Order contains a detailed discussion of the relevant facts. See Broaddus v. Shields, No. 08 C 4420, 2012 WL 28694, at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2012).*fn1
I. The Stipulation and Order
After Shields filed its motion for turnover of Broaddus' assets held by citation respondents Wintrust Wealth Management Company ("Wintrust") and Lake Forest Bank & Trust Company ("Lake Forest") on November 15, 2011, the Court set a briefing schedule pursuant to which responses were due on December 2, 2011. (R. 317.) Wintrust and Lake Forest filed a response in opposition on December 1, 2011 (the "Wintrust Response"), arguing that they were entitled to set off certain of the funds at issue from any turnover amount because Broaddus had defaulted on his loan obligations to them. (R. 320.) Lake Forest and Wintrust also claimed that they were entitled to set off attorney's fees and costs that they had incurred in connection with a foreclosure action they filed against Broaddus in Illinois state court. They attached a number of documents to their response, including various agreements, account records, and email correspondence. (Id.)
The next day, on December 2, 2011, Broaddus filed his response in opposition to Shields' motion for turnover, in which he asserted four arguments: 1) the funds at issue do not belong to Broaddus, but rather belong to Stanley, LLC ("Stanley"); 2) Shields cannot not summarily execute against the assets of a revocable trust; 3) the motion for turnover is untimely; and 4) Shields applies the wrong post-judgment interest rate. (R. 321.)
Twenty days later, on December 22, 2011, Shields filed his reply in support of his motion for turnover, in which he addressed Broaddus' arguments. (R. 323.) Along with his reply, he filed a motion to approve a stipulation into which he entered with Lake Forest and Wintrust.
(R. 325.) The motion represented that although Shields disputed whether Lake Forest and Wintrust had priority over him with respect to the funds at issue, he agreed to stipulate to their priority in an effort to resolve the issue. (R. 324, ¶ 10.) On January 5, 2012, the Court approved the stipulation and entered an order regarding the same. (R. 327.) Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order, Wintrust and Lake Forest 1) were entitled to set off $1,307,396.19 from the assets in the Wintrust Investment Account; and 2) were to hold the balance in that account, as well as the balance in Stanley's checking account, pursuant to pending citations until further order of the Court. (Id.)
In the January 5 Order, the Court granted Shields motion for turnover, ordering (1) Associated Bank to turn over to Shields $1,500.41 from Broaddus' checking account by January 31, 2012; (2) Lake Forest to turn over to Shields $11,745.47 from Stanley's checking account number *****587 to Shields by January 31, 2012; and (3) Wintrust to turn over to Shields $147,318.00 from the Wintrust Investment Account (number ***1110) by January 31, 2012. See Broaddus, 2012 WL 28694, at *11.
Rule 59(e) permits parties to file, within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment, a motion to alter or amend the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Motions under Rule 59(e) serve the limited function of allowing the Court to correct manifest errors of law or fact or consider newly discovered material evidence. See Seng--Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 505 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Resnick, 594 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2010). "It is well established that a motion to reconsider is only appropriate where a court has misunderstood a party, where the court has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, where the court has made an error of apprehension (not of reasoning), where a significant change in the law has occurred, or where significant new facts have been discovered." Broaddus v. Shields, 665 F.3d 846, 860 (7th Cir. 2011). Rule 59(e) "does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures" or "introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment." Resnick, 594 F.3d at 568 (citation omitted); see also County of McHenry v. Insurance Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 2006). "To support a motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence, the moving party must show not only that this evidence was newly discovered or unknown to it until after the hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such evidence." Caisse ...