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Grzegorz Zawadowicz v. Mark Vail

March 15, 2012

GRZEGORZ ZAWADOWICZ, PLAINTIFF,
v.
MARK VAIL, JOHN L. FOLINO, JR., TIMOTHY B. MCDERMOTT, AND SHEAMUS B. FERGUS, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Joan H. Lefkow

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This section 1983 civil rights case is before the court on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability under Count I of the complaint and defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Counts I and II. Grzegorz Zawadowicz alleges deprivation of his liberty in violation of the Fourth Amendment because he was held in custody of the defendant Chicago Police Department detectives for a period that prevented his being taken to court for a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours of his arrest (Count I). He also alleges false imprisonment under Illinois common law (Count II).*fn1 For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion [#102] will be granted and defendants' motion [#98] will be granted in part and denied in part.

UNCONTESTED FACTS*fn2

On July 26, 2006, at approximately 4:30 a.m., Marcin Strojny was beaten to death outside a bar located in Chicago. By August 2 before 10:00 a.m., Chicago Police Department detectives, defendants Mark Vail, Sheamus Fergus, John Folino, Jr., and Timothy McDermott, had reasonable cause based on their investigation to believe that Grzegorz Zawadowicz had committed the crime. Without a warrant, they arrested Zawadowicz at his home at about 10:00 a.m. on August 2. After the arrest, defendants questioned Zawadowicz for approximately three hours.*fn3 On August 3, they interviewed at least one additional witness, placed Zawadowicz in a lineup, and obtained and executed a search warrant at his home. The application for the search warrant was based on the affidavit of Brian Spain, another detective involved in the investigation, and sought permission to search Zawadowicz's person and his home to seize "Light colored sleeveless style shirt, dark jean style pants, light colored shoes and all other clothing items of evidentiary value, along with documents showing proof of residency." In support of the application, Spain attested that he had probable cause to believe that these items were then located on the person and premises set forth in the application. The factual basis for the warrant included recitation of evidence that "Zawadowicz . . . has been identified by four (4) eyewitnesses as having participated in the beating that resulted in Marcin Strojny [sic] death."

On August 4, officers transported Zawadowicz to a lockup at the 25th District police station where he was received at 9:12 a.m. Thereafter, Zawadowicz was not in defendants' custody. At 9:12 a.m. on August 4, Zawadowicz had been in the defendants' custody slightly more than 47 hours. At 9:43 a.m. on August 4, the State's Attorney approved a first degree murder charge against Zawadowicz. "In early noon [sic] or afternoon" of August 5, a Cook County judge found probable cause. Zawadowicz was then remanded to the custody of the Cook County Sheriff until June 1, 2009. On June 1, 2009 the case was dismissed without prejudice (order of nolle prosequi) after civilian witnesses did not appear in court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To determine whether any genuine issue of fact exists, the court must pierce the pleadings and assess the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits that are part of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) & Advisory Committee's notes. The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). In response, the non-moving party cannot rest on mere pleadings alone but must use the evidentiary tools listed above to designate specific material facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324; Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit. Insolia, 216 F.3d at 598--99. Although a bare contention that an issue of fact exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2000), the court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

ANALYSIS

I. The Fourth Amendment Claim

Relying on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975), and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991), Zawadowicz alleges deprivation of liberty without due process in that he was held in custody more than 48 hours before being taken before a judge for judicial determination of probable cause. Defendants argue that there is no evidence that defendants unreasonably delayed his probable cause hearing; rather, any responsibility belongs with the "lockup personnel" at the 25th District who received custody during the 48th hour.

Gerstein held that the Fourth Amendment entitles a person arrested without a warrant and held for trial under a prosecutor's information to a prompt determination by a neutral and detached magistrate of probable cause for continued pretrial restraint of his liberty. 420 U.S. at 114. McLaughlin put some flesh on the bones of "prompt" by setting a standard: "[W]e believe that a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. For this reason, such jurisdictions will be immune from systemic challenges." 500 U.S. at 56. Where detention lasts more than 48 hours, the government bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance which justified the delay. Id. at 57.

The undisputed facts point to the conclusion that defendants caused Zawadowicz to be denied a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of his arrest. That the defendants delivered him to the 25th District with less than an hour to present him in court, and the absence of evidence that a court hearing was available between 9:12 and 9:59 a.m. on August 4, plaintiff has established that defendants, through their 47-plus hour detention, denied Zawadowicz a prompt determination of probable cause. Defendants have offered no evidence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance that justified the delay. Their effort to pass responsibility off to an official who happens not to have been sued is a transparent effort to evade responsibility for an outcome they undoubtedly caused.*fn4

II. Qualified Immunity

Defendants first argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because it was reasonable for them to believe that the lockup personnel bore the responsibility to ensure that Zawadowicz appear in court within 48 hours. "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). They rely on Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2006), and Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 168--69 (7th Cir. 1987). Thus, the ...


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