Name of Assigned Judge Blanche M. Manning Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
For the reasons stated herein, the motion to dismiss [97-1] is denied.
O[ For further details see text below.]
Defendant Chicago Police Officer Joseph Carraga moves to dismiss the plaintiff Bobby Ford's § 1983 false arrest claim against him on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is denied.
Proceeding pro se, Bobby Ford submitted a complaint on October 30, 2009, against Chicago Police Department Officer Bell and "her John Doe partner," among others. According to Ford's allegations, he was falsely arrested, among other things, by Bell and her partner, on June 19, 2009, after a dispute with a former roommate. After granting Ford's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on November 13, 2009, the court dismissed Ford's complaint without prejudice due to misjoined claims and defendants. After several missteps, Ford finally submitted a third amended complaint, again pro se, which addressed the court's earlier bases for dismissal. Accordingly, the court reinstated the case on March 18, 2010, with the third amended complaint, which at this point named only the City of Chicago, Officer Bell and "Her Chicago Police Dept. Partner John Doe." After additional proceedings, including discovery, which has now been closed, the court appointed counsel to represent Ford on August 30, 2011. On October 27, 2011, appointed counsel filed a fourth amended complaint on behalf of Ford and, for the first time, named Officer Carraga as a defendant.
Illinois' two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies to Ford's § 1983 claim. Wade v. Collier, No. 10 C 6876, 2011 WL 832240, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2011). Therefore, Carraga contends, because he was not named as a defendant until October 27, 2011, more than two years after June 19, 2009, when the conduct at issue occurred, the false arrest claim against him must be dismissed as untimely. Ford responds that the amendment relates back to the original pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), and therefore, the claims against Carraga are timely. Specifically, Ford contends that he should be allowed to amend because (1) the original complaint did not just name John Doe generally but specifically identified the John Doe as "[Officer Bell's] Chicago Police Dept. Partner John Doe" and (2) once Ford learned the partner's name, he identified Carraga by name in several different filings, including his motion for summary judgment, all prior to the running of the statute of limitations period.
Without opining on whether the amended complaint relates back to the original complaint, the court concludes that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. "The doctrine of equitable tolling 'permits a plaintiff to sue after the statute of limitations has expired if through no fault or lack of diligence on his part he was unable to sue before, even though the defendant took no active steps to prevent him from suing.'" Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 95 F.3d 548, 561 (7th Cir. 1996).
As the Seventh Circuit has noted, "[n]ot only is the district court to view the pro se complaint with an understanding eye, but, while the court is not to become an advocate, it is incumbent on it to take appropriate measures to permit the adjudication of pro se claims on the merits, rather than to order their dismissal on technical grounds." Id. at 555. Moreover,
[n]umerous cases in this and other circuits have established that, when the substance of a pro se civil rights complaint indicates the existence of claims against individual officials not specifically named in the caption of the complaint, the district court must provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to amend the complaint. To the extent the plaintiff faces barriers to determining the identities of the unnamed defendants, the court must assist the plaintiff in conducting the necessary investigation.
Id. (footnote with numerous citations omitted). Assistance by the court to a pro se plaintiff might include "providing counsel for the limited purpose of amending the complaint" or "dismissing the complaint without prejudice and providing a list of defects in the complaint." Id. at 556.
In the instant case, the plaintiff asked on numerous occasions for appointment of counsel. The court, however, believing that Ford was capable of proceeding on his own with some direction from the court, denied his requests for appointment of counsel. Instead, it issued minute orders describing certain defects in the complaint and directing Ford to fix those defects in an amended complaint. See Dkts. 4, ...