The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Guy Dukes ("Dukes" or "Plaintiff"), in custody at the Cook County Jail as a pre-trial detainee, has filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dukes alleges that, in July 2009, Defendants, Superintendent Miller, Psychologist Stein, and Psychologist Morjal (hereinafter, the "Defendants"), violated his constitutional rights at the Cook County Jail when they denied him medication for a serious mental health condition when he was moved out of the cell house reserved for inmates with medical issues. Plaintiff has also named Defendant Cook County as the public entity for purposes of pursuing a claim under the American's with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
Presently pending before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Amended Response to Defendants' Material Statement of Facts and Supporting Exhibits. Defendants argue that Dukes has: (1) failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 e(a); (2) failed to show he suffered a physical injury; (3) failed to sustain his official and individual capacity claims against Defendants Miller and Morjal; and (4) failed to show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent. The record before the Court establishes that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, thus, for the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Response to their L.R. 56.1 Statement of Facts is granted in part and denied in part.
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). All of the evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Miller v. American Family Mutual Ins., 203 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment may be granted when no "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, a party cannot defeat summary judgment by relying on unsubstantiated facts or by merely resting on its pleadings. See Hemsworth, II v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007); Greer v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 267 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 2001). Instead, the party that bears the burden of proof on an issue must affirmatively demonstrate, with admissible evidence, that a genuine issue of material fact exists that requires a trial. See Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490.
When Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, they included a "Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment" as required by Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982); and Local Rule 56.2. This notice clearly set out the requirements of this Court's Local Rule 56.1. In particular, the notice explains that Dukes' response must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Local Rule 56.1.
Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to file:
(A) a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon, and
(B) a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.
L.R. 56.1(b). The district court may require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1, even though the plaintiff is proceeding pro se. See Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Serv., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004); Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir 2000) (strict compliance with the local rules governing summary judgment is upheld given the importance of local rules that structure the summary judgment process); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs").
Although pro se plaintiffs are entitled to lenient standards, compliance with procedural rules is required. Members v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1998) ("rules apply to uncounseled litigants and must be enforced"); Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994). Despite being given this notice, Dukes failed to adequately respond to Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts. See "Plaintiff's Response Before Summary Judgment: Memorandum Answer." (Dkt. #73). The Seventh Circuit has "routinely held that a district court may strictly enforce compliance with its local rules regarding summary judgment motions." Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., Case No. 10 C 1368, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15896 **7-8 (7th Cir. August 3, 2011); citing Schmidt v. Eagle Waste & Recycling, Inc., 599 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2010).
Because Dukes is proceeding pro se, the Court will consider the factual assertions he makes in his response, but only to the extent that Plaintiff could properly testify about the matters at trial -- that is, only with respect to those facts within Plaintiff's personal knowledge. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
The following facts are taken from Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement, from the record attached to Defendants Rule 56.1 Statement, and from Dukes' response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment to the ...