The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael P. McCUSKEY Chief U.S. District Judge
Tuesday, 31 January, 2012 01:52:46 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
In May 2011, Petitioner, Jammie Allen, filed several pro se Motions in his criminal case, Case No. 09-CR-20050. On May 19, 2011, this court entered an Order advising Petitioner that his pro se Motions would be construed as a Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This case was therefore opened and Petitioner's Motions were filed as a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (#1). On May 19, 2011, the Government filed a Motion to Dismiss (#3) arguing that Petitioner's Motions sought relief available only under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Government argued that the Motions should be dismissed because Petitioner waived his right to file a Motion under § 2255. On May 31, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se supplement to his Motion under § 2255 (#5). On June 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (#6). On July 6, 2011, the Government filed another Motion to Dismiss (#7) arguing that Petitioner's Motions under § 2255 must be dismissed based upon his clear waiver. On July 27, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se Response to the Motion to Dismiss (#9).
This court has carefully reviewed the arguments of the parties and the record in Petitioner's criminal case. Following this careful and thorough review, this court agrees with the Government that Petitioner clearly waived his right to bring a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Therefore, the Government's Motions to Dismiss (#3, #7) are GRANTED and all of Petitioner's Motions (#1, #5, #6) are dismissed.
PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASE
On July 7, 2009, in Case Number 09-CR-20050, Petitioner was charged by indictment with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). On July 13, 2009, John C. Taylor of the Federal Public Defender's Office was appointed to represent Petitioner. On December 10, 2009, Petitioner pled guilty to the charge pursuant to a written plea agreement.
The written plea agreement stated that the parties disagreed regarding whether Petitioner's prior felony escape conviction qualified as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. The agreement stated:
If it is a crime of violence, the defendant's base offense level is 20 pursuant to §2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because the defendant committed the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of a crime of violence. If it is not a crime of violence, the defendant's base offense level is 14 pursuant to §2K2.1(a)(6)(A) because the defendant was a prohibited person at the time he committed the offense. The parties understand that the Court will resolve this issue at sentencing and that the Court's ruling on this issue, one way or the other, will not be grounds for the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty or to appeal his conviction and/or sentence."
In addition, the agreement stated that the Government and Petitioner agreed that Petitioner's "offense level should be increased by four levels pursuant to §2K2.1(b)(6) because the defendant possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense" and that Petitioner's offense level would be decreased by three levels for acceptance of responsibility.
The plea agreement provided that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to ...