Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge James F. Holderman than Assigned Judge
For the reasons set forth in the Statement section of this order, "Lake County Metropolitan Enforcement
Group's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings"  is denied.
O[ For further details see text below.] Notices mailed by Judicial staff.
Before the Court is Defendant Lake County Metropolitan Enforcement Group's ("LCMEG") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Dkt. No. 111). For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.
Plaintiff Germaine Nixon ("Nixon"), the mother of Mycol French ("French"), brought suit against several law enforcement defendants as the administrator of her son's estate following his Feb. 1, 2010, shooting death, allegedly at the hands of police. Nixon's original complaint, filed March 3, 2010, named various municipalities and unknown officers. (Dkt. No. 1.) LCMEG, a joint task force of officers working in Lake County, was not named in the original complaint. Nixon filed an Amended Complaint on May 26, 2010, adding the Illinois State Police as a respondent in discovery. (Dkt. No. 8.) LCMEG was not named in the Amended Complaint.
On Feb. 28, 2011, Nixon filed a Second Amended Complaint naming the officers allegedly involved and, for the first time, naming LCMEG as a defendant. (Dkt. No. 29 ("Sec. Am. Compl.").) Nixon seeks to recover for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and brings wrongful death and survival actions under Illinois law. LCMEG is named in one count, Count VI, labeled "Reimbursement Claim." Sec. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 37--39. In that claim, Nixon alleges that LCMEG was the employer of some of the individual defendants and that they were acting in the scope of their duties when French was killed. Nixon demands that LCMEG pay any judgment or settlement entered against its employees, including all amounts for damages and costs.
LCMEG has answered the Second Amended Complaint, and now seeks judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In ruling on a motion brought under Rule 12(c), the court employs the same standards as it would in ruling on a pre-answer motion brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007). The court takes the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. While the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, it can be the basis for a Rule 12(c) motion if the running of the statute is apparent from the face of the pleadings. See Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Trust Co., 477 F.3d 924, 925--26 (7th Cir. 2007).
LCMEG argues that judgment on the pleadings is proper for a number of reasons: (1) no tort for "reimbursement" exists; (2) if Nixon meant to state a claim for indemnification under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/9-102, that claim is time-barred and does not relate back to Nixon's original complaint; and (3) Nixon lacks standing to bring an indemnification claim. The court rejects all of these arguments.
First, the "reimbursement" claim is inartfully labeled. However, in federal court, it is not the label of a claim that matters, but its substance. Potter v. Janus Inv. Fund, 483 F. Supp. 2d 692, 697 (S.D. Ill. 2007). Here, Nixon's reimbursement claim was sufficiently pleaded to put LCMEG on notice of the claim against it, so it may stand.
Next, LCMEG argues that an indemnification claim under 745 ILCS 10/9-102 is time-barred. Section 9-102, provides, in relevant part:
A local public entity is empowered and directed to pay any tort judgment or settlement for compensatory damages (and may pay any associated attorney's fees and costs) for which it or an employee while acting within the scope of his ...