The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Joan B. Gottschall
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
The County of San Mateo ("San Mateo") filed suit against defendants CSL Limited, CSL Behring LLC, and CSL Plasma (collectively, "CSL"), Baxter International Inc. ("Baxter"), and Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association ("PPTA"), alleging that the defendants violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, as well twenty-five states' antitrust laws and fourteen states' unfair competition or consumer protection laws, by virtue of a conspiracy to "restrict output to artificially raise, fix, maintain and/or stabilize the prices of Plasma-Derivative Protein Therapies in the United States." (See Indirect-Purchaser Plaintiff's Class Action Compl. ¶ 280, ECF No. 367-2.) The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that San Mateo lacks standing to pursue its claims, and that certain of San Mateo's state law claims fail for various reasons. For the reasons stated below, the court grants in part and denies in part the defendants' motion and requests additional briefing as to certain issues.
This multi-district litigation presently consists of almost twenty actions brought on behalf of direct and indirect purchasers of plasma-derivative protein therapies against the defendants. In their consolidated amended complaint (see ECF No. 222), the direct purchaser plaintiffs alleged that CSL and Baxter, the two largest domestic producers of plasma-derivative therapies, conspired along with PPTA, a trade association, to restrict supplies of plasma-derivative therapies and to raise prices in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. All defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint for failure to state a claim under the standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and PPTA and CSL filed separate motions arguing additional grounds for dismissal. The court denied all of these motions. See In re Plasma-Derivative Protein Therapies Antitrust Litig., 764 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Ill. 2011). In particular, while the court agreed that the defendants made "a somewhat convincing case that all of plaintiffs' allegations can be explained as behavior perfectly in line with the firms' independent self-interest," the court noted that at the motion to dismiss stage, "the plaintiffs need only allege a conspiracy which is plausible in light of the competing explanations," which the complaint had done. See id. at 1002-03. Following that decision, the parties submitted a proposed scheduling order, which this court entered. (See ECF No. 330.) Under the schedule, the direct purchaser plaintiffs' motion for class certification is not due until November 2012, after fact discovery closes.
At about the same time that the court entered the scheduling order, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred to this court a putative class-action suit filed by a single named plaintiff, San Mateo, which was brought on behalf of indirect purchasers of plasma-derivative therapies. (See Compl. ¶ 23 ("Plaintiff brings this action, on behalf of itself and all those similarly situated in an Identified State that purchased Plasma-Derivative Protein Therapies indirectly from Defendants.").) In the complaint, San Mateo explains that it operates a medical center through which it administers a county-wide health care system. (Id. ¶ 28-29.) As part of that program, the medical center indirectly purchases plasma-derivative protein therapies for use in treating patients, for sale to patients via its pharmacies, and for laboratory use. (Id. ¶ 29.) Prior to 2007, San Mateo purchased these therapies from spot markets organized by independent distributors or by group purchasing organizations ("GPOs") to which San Mateo belonged. (Id. ¶ 59.) Thereafter, San Mateo began purchasing annual allocations of the therapies either from distributors who had purchased the therapies from manufacturers, or from GPOs that negotiated contracts with manufacturers on behalf of their members. (Id. ¶ 60.) Despite these alternate arrangements, San Mateo claims it was forced to keep purchasing plasma-derivative protein therapies on the spot market at a higher price due to supply shortages caused by the defendants' conspiracy. (Id. ¶¶ 61-62.)
San Mateo alleges the same violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act that the direct purchasers alleged (Count I)*fn1 , but it also alleges violations of various state antitrust laws (Count II)*fn2 and state unfair competition or consumer protection laws (Count III)*fn3 . San Mateo includes argument directed toward its attempt to proceed as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and defines its "Indirect Purchaser Class" as follows:
All persons and entities in the United States who purchased Plasma-Derivative Protein Therapies indirectly from any Defendant at any time from at least as early as July 1, 2003 through the present ("Class Period") and, which meet the definition of one or more of the Identified State Subclasses. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities of the federal government.
San Mateo also defines thirty putative subclasses using this definition and replacing "the United States" with the name of each relevant state. San Mateo seeks to proceed under Rule 23(b)(3), arguing that common questions of fact will predominate in this case.
Together, the defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). First, they argue that this court should decide the issue of San Mateo's Article III standing before deciding whether to certify the class, and that San Mateo-being located in California and having not purchased plasma therapies in any other state-lacks standing to proceed except as to its California state law claims. Further, the defendants claim that San Mateo lacks antitrust standing based on the considerations delineated in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters ("AGC"), 459 U.S. 519 (1983), and that all of San Mateo's claims should be dismissed for this reason. Finally, the defendants allege that San Mateo's state law claims fail for various reasons, which the court does not reach at this time.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the defendant may seek to dismiss the case if the plaintiff "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 623 F.3d 436, 438 (7th Cir. 2010). But although Rule 8(a) only requires the complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," nonetheless the complaint must include "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The relevant question is whether the complaint includes enough factual allegations to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. In other words, to survive a motion to dismiss post-Twombly, "'the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together,' and the question the court should ask is 'could these things have happened, not did they happen.'" Estate of Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Moreover, Rule 8 "simply specifies the conditions of the formal adequacy of a pleading"-it does not set forth the complaint's "substantive adequacy, that is, its legal merit." Cnty. of McHenry v. Ins. Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the non-moving party is required to provide some legal basis in support of his complaint, and "although the district court is required to consider whether a plaintiff could prevail under any legal theory or set of facts, it 'will not invent legal arguments for litigants,'" nor is it "'obliged to accept as true legal conclusions or unsupported conclusions of fact.'" Id. (quoting Hickey v. O'Bannon, 287 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2002), and Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir. 1995)).
A. Article III Standing and Class ...