The opinion of the court was delivered by: Amy J. St. Eve, District Court Judge:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In their Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Plaintiffs Catherine Zaborowski and Simone Jackson, individually, and on behalf of a class ("Class Plaintiffs"), allege violations of their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights and state law against Thomas J. Dart, the Sheriff of Cook County, in his official capacity, in relation to the alleged policy of shackling pregnant detainees*fn1 during labor, delivery, and/or recovery following delivery. The Individual Plaintiffs allege an individual capacity claim against Sheriff Dart based on his delay in instituting any remedial action after he learned about the shackling policy.
Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on the Class Plaintiffs' official capacity and state law claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Also before the Court is Sheriff Dart's motion for summary judgment as to the Individual Plaintiffs' individual capacity claim, also brought pursuant to Rule 56. Because there are genuine disputes as to the material facts underlying the Class Plaintiffs' substantive due process and state law claims, the Court denies the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court, however, grants Sheriff Dart's motion for summary judgment in regard to the individual capacity claim and dismisses Sheriff Dart in his individual capacity from this lawsuit.
I. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1
Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 assists the Court by "organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side propose[s] to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence." Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000). "The Rule is designed, in part, to aid the district court, 'which does not have the advantage of the parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,' in determining whether a trial is necessary." Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Specifically, Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue." Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009). "The opposing party is required to file 'a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." Id. (citing N.D. Ill. R. 56.1(b)(3)(B)). Also, Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) requires the nonmoving party to present a separate statement of additional facts that requires the denial of summary judgment. See Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2008).
The purpose of Local Rule 56.1 statements is to identify the relevant admissible evidence supporting the material facts, not to make factual or legal arguments. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006) ("statement of material facts did  not comply with Rule 56.1 as it failed to adequately cite the record and was filled with irrelevant information, legal arguments, and conjecture"). The Court may disregard statements and responses that do not properly cite to the record. See Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C., 401 F.3d 803, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the requirements for responses under Local Rule 56.1 are "not satisfied by evasive denials that do not fairly meet the substance of the material facts asserted." Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 528. "District courts have broad discretion to enforce and require strict compliance with their local rules." Benuzzi v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 647 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2011).
Many of the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses are argumentative, evasive, and do not properly cite to the record. When culling the relevant facts of this case, the Court considered each statement and response individually to determine whether they were proper under the local rules.
This case is partially proceeding as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for: "All women in the custody of defendant Sheriff on and after December 4, 2006, who have been or who will be shackled during labor, delivery, or recovery following delivery." (R. 217, Pls.' Rule 56.1 Stmt. Facts ¶ 1.) The Individual Plaintiffs, who are bringing an individual capacity claim against Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, include Nicole Blair, Lisa Brown, Danielle Bryant, Isabel Carmona, Marianne Cruz, Cora Fletcher, Denae Johnson, Deborah Lee, Felicia Ligon, Angela Oss, Sheena Richardson, Bennetta Sidney, Monique Starnes, and Latania Walton. (R. 221, Defs.' Rule 56.1 Stmt. Facts ¶ 3.) Defendants are the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois.*fn2 (Pls.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 2.)
In 1999, the Sheriff's Office created the Department of Women's Justice Services ("DWJS") that specifically focuses on women offenders. (R. 214, Dart Rule 56.1 Stmt. Facts ¶ 34.) The DWJS's mission is to create integrated programs and services that break the inter-generational cycle of trauma, addiction, and crime for women and their children. (Id.) These goals are achieved through various programs, including the Maternal Objective Management ("MOMs") program. (Id.) The MOMs program is a residential program that is currently located outside of the Cook County Jail ("CCJ") Complex at the Haymarket Center and provides pregnant and postpartum detainees treatment for mental health, physical health, and substance abuse, as well as other supportive services. (Pls.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 5; Dart Stmt. Facts ¶ 55; Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 24.)
From December 2006 until October 14, 2008, if a pregnant detainee assigned to the MOMs program was in labor, a Haymarket staff member would transport her to an outlying hospital, which in most cases was the John H. Stroger, Jr. Hospital of Cook County. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 16; Dart Stmt. Facts ¶ 58.) Also during this time period, correctional officers did not restrain detainees in the MOMs program while they were at the MOMs facility or in transport to or from a medical facility. (Dart Stmt. Facts ¶ 59; R. 242, Pls.' Stmt. Add'l Facts ¶1.) Up until October 14, 2008, once a MOMs participant was admitted to a hospital, she was turned over to External Operations staff to be guarded in accordance with the External Operations policy in effect. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 29; Dart Stmt. Facts ¶ 60.) Effective October 14, 2008, correctional officers did not restrain detainees in the MOMs program in any way during the course of their pregnancy, including transportation to the hospital, labor, delivery, or post-delivery recovery. (Dart Stmt. Facts ¶ 64; Pls.' Stmt. Add'l Facts ¶ 3.)
Pregnant detainees at the CCJ Complex who were eligible for placement in the MOMs program often remained at the CCJ Complex if the MOMs program was full. (Pl.'s Stmt. Facts ¶ 6.) There is evidence in the record that until April 2010, correctional officers shackled pregnant detainees housed at the CCJ Complex while transporting them to the hospital and at the hospital while they were in labor. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 23(b).) A correctional officer would accompany a pregnant detainee housed at the CCJ Complex in the ambulance on the way to the hospital and one or two other correctional officers would follow in a squad car. (Id. ¶ 12.)
The Sheriff of Cook County's Policy Number EO-32, External Operations, Hospital Policy and Procedure, effective July 25, 2006, concerning the procedures for transporting detainees housed outside of the CCJ Complex, states:
(a) "In accordance with Illinois Statute 730 ILCS 125/17.5 (Pregnant Female Prisoners) NO handcuffs, leg irons or waist chains shall be used on a female inmate (detainee) who is in labor, this ...