Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit, Peoria County, Illinois, Circuit No. 07-CF-1489 Honorable James E. Shadid, Judge, Presiding.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Lytton
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Carter and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
¶ 1 Defendant Lizarro Munoz was convicted of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(1) (West 2006)) and sentenced to 17 years in prison plus 2 years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). On appeal, he argues that (1) the Department of Corrections' (DOC) records should be corrected to comply with the trial court's sentence, and (2) the DNA testing and $200 analysis fee should be vacated. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.
¶ 2 Defendant pled guilty to criminal sexual assault and aggravated robbery. In exchange for defendant's plea, the State agreed to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge and suggest a sentencing cap of 17 years in prison and 2 years of MSR. Following the State's presentation of the factual basis for the plea, the trial court sentenced defendant to the agreed terms and ordered defendant to submit to DNA testing and pay an analysis fee. The trial court's written sentencing judgment reflected defendant's sentence of 17 years' imprisonment and a 2-year term of MSR. After sentencing, the Department of Corrections inmate records listed defendant's MSR terms as "3 Yrs to Life-To Be Determined."
¶ 3 I. Indeterminate Term of MSR Imposed by DOC
¶ 5 Defendant claims that the DOC lacked the authority to impose an indeterminate term of MSR of three years to life when the trial court sentenced him to two years of MSR.
¶ 6 The imposition of MSR is statutorily required. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2006). When construing the meaning of a statute, the primary objective of this court is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390 (2006). That intent is best determined by examining the language of the statute itself; where the language is clear and unambiguous it must be given effect. Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill. 2d 1 (2007). A statute should be read as a whole and construed so as to give effect to every word, clause and sentence. People ex rel. Department of Corrections v. Hawkins, 2011 IL 110792. It should not be read so as to render any part superfluous or meaningless. Hawkins, 2011 IL 110792,
¶ 23. Statutory construction is a question of law which we review de novo. People v. Alcozer, 241 Ill. 2d 248 (2011).
¶ 7 Under the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 2006)), a sentence is defined as the "disposition imposed by the court on a convicted defendant." 730 ILCS 5/5-1-19 (West 2006). The pronouncement of a sentence is the judicial act that conforms to the judgment of the court. People v. Allen, 71 Ill. 2d 378 (1978). A sentence imposed by the court in a criminal case must be authorized by law. People v. Majer, 131 Ill. App. 3d 80 (1985). The dispositions available to courts include probation, conditional discharge and a term of imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 (West 2006).
¶ 8 Section 5-8-1(d) of the Code states that "every sentence shall include as though written therein a term [of MSR] in addition to the term of imprisonment." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2006); see also People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (2005) (MSR is part of a defendant's sentence). The MSR term for the offense of criminal sexual assault "shall range from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the defendant." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2006).
¶ 9 The Code also provides the DOC, through the Prisoner Review Board, the ability to terminate a term of MSR early. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-8 (West 2006). Article 3 of the Code governs the Department of Corrections and addresses the powers and duties of the Prisoner Review Board. 730 ILCS 5/3-1-1 et seq. (West 2006). Under section 3-3-8(b), the Prisoner Review Board may enter an order releasing a defendant from MSR when it determines "that he is likely to remain at liberty without committing another offense." 730 ILCS 5/3-3-8(b) (West 2006). The Prisoner Review Board is also authorized to set conditions for parole and mandatory supervised release imposed under section 5-8-1(d) of the ...